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Abstract
Despite the continuous efforts of the international community to address water scarcity,
millions of people continue to lack access to safe drinking water and sanitation services.
Water problems are often explained as natural phenomena or the result of technical
failures, overlooking the fact that in many cases, water crises are those of socio-political
inequalities rather than of scarcity. Examining water inequities, as political ecologists
maintain, requires paying attention to the underlying power structures that perpetuate
those injustices, and the agency available to people. My case study, located in Tripoli,
Lebanon, attempts to understand those dynamics, specifically in relation to the role of
civil society in enacting mass mobilizations around water issues. The latter was clearly
lacking in the context of not only Tripoli but also on a national level. The Lebanese
experience shows that the possibility of mobilizing for water equity does not solely
depend on the prevalence of injustices, but is determined by other factors. This also
underscores the possibility that hydrosocial agency doesn’t just manifest through
political claims for water justice such as mass mobilizations. Other invisible struggles
must not be forgotten when water inequities are the object of interest. Political
ecologists, therefore, need to pay closer attention to how other forms of agency operate
in the absence of social mobilization, for such agency is certainly social and ecological,
and forms part of the fabric of power relations. If this thesis only scratched the surface
of such practices, I would put them foremost on the future research agenda for
understanding hydrosocial relations in Lebanon.

Table of Contents
Chapter I: Introduction
1

Research Problem

6

2

Research Objectives

7

3

Literature Review
3.1 The Nature of Water
3.2 Towards a Political Ecology of Water Justice
3.3 Water security
3.4 Governance
3.5 The Potential and Limitations of the Right to Water

10
10
12
13
16
17

4

Methodology
4.1 Literature Review
4.1.1 Ethnographic Approach
4.1.2 In-depth Interviews
4.1.3 Non-participant Observation
4.1.4 Discourse Analysis
4.2 Data Collection and Analysis
4.2.1 Interviews
4.2.2 Limitations

19
20
20
20
21
21
23
23
28

Chapter II: Context of Tripoli, Lebanon
1

Historical and Political Context
1.1 Emergence of modern Tripoli
1.2 French Colonialism and the Birth of Greater Lebanon
1.3 Post-independence

30
30
31
32

2

Socio-economic conditions
2.1 Social makeup
2.2 Economy
2.3 Living Conditions
2.4 Repercussions of the Syrian crisis
2.4.1 Economic impacts
2.4.2 Political impact
2.5 Marginalization

32
32
33
34
35
35
36
36

Chapter III: The Right to Water
1

Legal Context of The Right to Water
1.1 Historical Perspective
1.2 Contemporary Laws
1.2.1 Code de L’eau

39
39
40
41

2

Governance Scheme of the Water Sector
2.1 A Shift Towards a Neoliberalized Water Sector
2.2 Involvement of the Private Sector

42
45
46

3

Current State of The Right to Water in Tripoli
3.1 Water Availability and Accessibility

49
51

4

3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
4

Water Demand and Consumption Patterns
Condition of the Water Infrastructure
Water Quality
Water Affordability
Injustice for Low-income Populations
Neighbourhoods Suffering from Water shortage – Coping Strategies

The Right to Water: Findings and Analysis
4.1 Perspectives on the ‘Right to Water’
4.2 Discourse of Water Scarcity, Technical Solutions and Privatization
4.3 Public Engagement and the Right to Participate in Policymaking
4.3.1 Perspective of Government Officials and Water Professionals
4.3.2 Perspective of NGOs and Activists
4.3.3 Friends of Water Association

54
55
56
57
59
60
62
62
67
69
71
72
74

Chapter IV: Social Agency
1

Introduction

78

2

Historical Context: Overview of Arab Social Movements
2.1 Origins and Evolution of Civil Society in the Arab World
2.2 Re-emergence of Arab Civil Society
2.2.1 Arab Civil Society and Democracy

80
80
82
84

3

Case Study: Tripoli, Lebanon
3.1 Overview of Advocacy Networks and Campaigns
3.1.1 Advocacy for Public Spaces
3.1.2 Response to the Waste Crisis
3.2 Explanations for the lack of mobilizations around water justice
3.2.1 Complexity of the Water Sector
3.2.2 Invisibility of Water Injustices
3.2.3 Clientelist networks
3.2.4 Weak Civil Society – Weak Mobilization Base
3.2.5 Passivity and Forced Adaptation

85
86
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
95

Chapter V: Concluding Remarks
4.1 Obstacles and Challenges to Social Mobilization
4.2 Future Opportunities and Strategies for CSOs
4.3 From Water Justice to Hydrosocial Agency

99
102
103

Bibliography

106

Appendix A – Water Sector Actors

116

Appendix B – Water Laws and Regulations

118

Appendix C – NGOs and Advocacy Networks

119

Appendix D – Advocacy Campaigns

126

Appendix E – Reflexivity

134

5

Introduction
“Until justice rolls down like water, and righteousness like a mighty stream.”
– Martin Luther King

1 Research Problem
Water is life, and its vitality for social wellbeing, dignity, justice, and mere existence is
irreplaceable. Nevertheless, and despite the continuous efforts of the international
community to address water scarcity, millions of people continue to lack access to safe
drinking water and sanitation services (Sadoff et al., 2015; World Bank, 2015). In the
Middle East specifically, 75% of the population is identified as living under the water
scarcity level, defined as 1000 m3/year, which is further exacerbated given the violent
conflicts the region is currently experiencing (UNESCO, 2015). Lebanon is no exception
as it is believed to be facing a water crisis that is exacerbated by climate change (World
Bank, 2012), and the recent influx of Syrian refugees (ACTED, 2012). Figure 1
demonstrates a map of Lebanon.
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Figure 1: Map of Lebanon (Source: ArcGIS Online)

2 Research Objectives
There is a need to uncover and challenge the underlying socio-economic and political
power relations that continue to shape and produce inequitable hydrosocial
configurations. The main objective of my research is to examine the role of civil society
organizations in promoting water justice, understood here not only as a more equitable
distribution of water resources, but also as a more democratic approach to water policy.
In turn, the research also aims to characterize the obstacles that may prevent change
towards greater levels of water justice. Broadly speaking, the research is informed by
7

the conceptual framework provided by political ecology, combining concerns for political
economic power relations with other dimensions such as the role of knowledge and
discourse in shaping debates and limiting democratic access to policy decisions.
Tripoli is the second largest urban centre in Lebanon and one where poverty
levels reach as high as 57% (Nehmeh, 2010). Recognizing that poverty exacerbates
people’s experience of social and environmental injustices, Tripoli represents a relevant
case study for the research topic at hand. Additionally, Lebanon has undergone
institutional transformations that align with the neoliberal agenda (Makarem, 2015), and
is believed to be “the closest [of developing countries in the region] to fulfilling the
prescription of the mainstream development discourse” (Eid-Sabbagh, 2014, p. 19). A
neoliberal agenda that values free Market and economic growth above all else was
seen as capable of transcending violent conflicts that became most vivid during the civil
war (Baumann, 2012). New policies have opened the way for the private sector to
become increasingly involved in water services in Tripoli. This is occurring in response
to failures in the public system of water treatment and delivery, but also in a context
where the human right to water is increasingly touted by global organizations,
transnational corporations and political actors at various scales. In light of these
circumstances, I set out to investigate what the ‘right to water’ means and to what extent
civil society is involved in grassroots mobilization to address prevalent water injustices.
The overarching research focus on water justice and civil society organizations
translates into these specific questions for the case study:
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1. Is the 'right to water' being invoked in relation to water provision for marginalized
neighbourhoods in Tripoli, and what kinds of water policy agendas are promoted
within this discursive frame?
2. To what extent are civil society organizations active in advocating for water
justice, and what are the nature of the barriers that they encounter as they seek
to influence policy debates?
3. Are civil society organizations effective at building capacity for ordinary citizens to
become engaged in public debates over water policy?

In the early stages of research I found that, aside from occasional sparse voices,
there is no evidence of social movements in relation to water advocacy in Tripoli. This
led me to focus greater attention on two related questions:
4. How can we explain the lack of mobilization around water issues, given the
deteriorated state of water services in Tripoli in particular and Lebanon in
general?
5. Given the lack of social mobilization around water justice, what other kinds of
agency

are

available

to

citizens,

especially

those

in

marginalized

neighbourhoods, as they deal with water scarcity?
The lack of local social movements in Tripoli, along with the relatively modest influence
of the civil society landscape there, also led me to expand some of my research
activities to Beirut in order to capture a broader picture of the opportunities and
constraints shaping citizen engagement with water issues in the country.
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The rest of this introductory chapter presents a literature review of how water
problems are explained from the perspective of mainstream neoliberal worldview vs.
that of political ecology. I then describe the methodology and fieldwork procedures. The
rest of the thesis falls into three main chapters. Chapter II provides a brief overview of
Tripoli’s historical, political, and social context. Chapter III explores water issues within
Tripoli, especially focusing on the nature of public discourse around the ‘right to water’
and what it means from the perspectives of research participants. Finally, chapter IV
offers explanations for the lack of mass mobilization around water injustices, and
illuminates the largely invisible ways in which citizens cope with water injustices.

3 Literature Review
3.1 The Nature of Water
There is a universal acknowledgement of, and efforts to address, the current threats
and scarcities that water resources are under, yet the very nature of water is differently
perceived, and even contested, across different fields of knowledge (Melo Zurita et al.,
2015). Within the mainstream international discourse, water is valued for its importance
in realizing social equity, economic growth, and ecosystem integrity – the three pillars of
sustainable development as enshrined in the Brundtland Report (World Commission on
Environment and Development, 1987). The United Nations, for example, defines water
as “an essential primary natural resource upon which nearly all social and economic
activities and ecosystem functions depend” (UNESCO, 2015, p. 9). Along the same
lines, the World Water Council describes water as a public good and economic resource
vital in generating benefits, and a social resource important for wellbeing (WWC, 2015).
Clearly, water according to the hegemonic worldview is considered a resource and a
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wealth-generating good that can be managed and controlled with appropriate technical
solutions realized through financial investments to achieve global sustainable
development.
Echoes of this discourse can be found in the news, where the value of water in
promoting socio-economic growth is emphasized (McCarthy, 2015), and water itself is
perceived as a commodity that invites the intervention of the private sector (McKenna,
2015). Indeed, Peter Barbeck-Letmathe, the chairman of Nestlé, has called for
collaboration with the private sector (Mathiesen, 2016) to achieve the intended water
goals as framed in the 2030 Sustainable Development agenda: “Goal 6. Ensure
availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all” (United Nations,
2015b, p. 20). The hegemonic conceptualization embodies a neoliberal orientation to
water issues as characterized by Karen Bakker (2005), who warns that such a
worldview promotes the privatization of water, which consequently leads to further
marginalization of the poor and the reinforcement of pre-existing inequalities (Castro,
2008).
While water according to the neoliberal worldview is identified as a commodity,
there are other ways of viewing water and water security. For instance, a historical
materialist approach suggests that material inequalities, i.e. water injustices, lie in
political and economic processes. Water insecurity then needs to be understood as a
result of human-nature dynamics, including the social relations of production (Loftus,
2015). From the perspective of historical materialism, water is perceived “as a combined
physical and social process, as a hybridized socio-natural flow that fuses together
nature and society” (Swyngedouw, 2009, p. 56). This relation between water and
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society is embodied in certain hydrosocial configurations that are produced through
political, economic, physical, cultural, and social processes (Swyngedouw, 2009). To
highlight the role of economic and political dominance in affecting water circulation,
water activist Robert Kennedy once remarked: “Water no longer flows downhill. It flows
towards money” (Quoted in Swyngedouw, 2009, p. 56).
Taking a historical materialist approach as its underlying theoretical basis, the
rest of the literature review provides an overview of the concepts of water security,
water governance, and the right to water. Perspectives from the field of political ecology
are particularly central to arriving at a final characterization of water justice, which in
turn informs my study.

3.2 Towards a Political Ecology of Water Justice
With its roots in political economy, political ecology further expands to study humannature relations under the influence of power, which plays a significant role in shaping,
politicizing, and constructing those relationships (Biersack, 2006; Heynen, Kaika, &
Swyngedouw, 2006; Peet, Robbins, & Watts, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2009). Hence,
political ecology aims to investigate the underlying causes of manifest socio-economic
and environmental inequalities.
As demonstrated earlier, vulnerable populations have, and will continue to have,
less access to adequate water and sanitation services as an outcome of the
contemporary global water crisis, which is only expected to intensify in the foreseeable
future (World Bank, 2015). A political ecology approach helps in investigating why the
poor have less access, and how incidents of water injustice persist even in cases where
access is apparently improved (Truelove, 2011).
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Political ecologists concur that the right to water should necessitate the right to
participate in shaping and/or reshaping the hydrosocial landscape (Boelens, 2014;
Castro, 2007; Linton, 2012; Loftus, 2015; Melo Zurita et al., 2015; Swyngedouw, 2009).
In pursuit of more equitable hydrosocial landscapes, political ecology is essential in
understanding processes that underlie water injustices because a political ecology of
water justice helps in understanding how different political, economic, social, and
cultural power relations intertwine to produce and reproduce prevailing conditions of
inequalities. Bringing this perspective to the fore can help us see some of the key
limitations in the dominant discourses around water security, water governance and the
right to water.

3.3 Water security
“Ours is a world in which ‘thirsty agriculture’ and ‘thirsty energy’ compete with the needs
of ‘thirsty cities’”; this is how the senior director of the World Bank’s Global Water
Practice (GP) described water scarcity, a phenomenon characterized by the increased
“stress” on water resources, and hence the lack of access to adequate water quantity
and quality (World Bank, 2015). Some of the identified causes of water stress include
pollution of freshwater bodies, rising demands of different sectors, rapid population
growth, unsustainable consumption rates, and an increase in the likelihood and
magnitude of climate disasters such as floods and droughts (OECD, 2013; Sadoff et al.,
2015; World Bank, 2015; WWC, 2015; WWF, 2016). Several sources point to the
associated economic, social, and physical risks, some of which have already started to
materialize, and are predicted to affect a large proportion of the world’s population –
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mainly the poorest – by 2050 (McCarthy, 2015; OECD, 2013; Sadoff et al., 2015; World
Bank, 2015; WWF, 2016).
In the face of increasing water stress around the world, the notion of water
security has become central to global dialogue and cooperation to address the issue.
Water security is defined as the ability of populations to access adequate quantity and
quality of water necessary for maintaining healthy livelihoods, ecosystems, and
economies within a politically stable atmosphere (UN-Water, 2013). Ultimately,
improved water security is closely linked to improved human security, the latter defined
by Barnet and O’Brien (2013) “as a condition in which people and communities have the
capacity to respond to threats to their basic needs and rights, so that they can live with
dignity” (p. 375).
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a number of international initiatives have
sought to promote water security, the first being the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), which aimed to “halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation” (United Nations, 2015a,
p. 58). Shortly afterwards, the decade of 2005 to 2015 was declared by the United
Nations General Assembly as the ‘Water for Life Decade’ to further stress the
importance of universalizing water services (UNO-IDFA, 2015). Other initiatives include
the Global Water Partnership’s (GWP) strategy 2009-2013 and that of the World Water
Council (WWC) 2016-2018, both of which call for universalizing water security. Despite
the significant increase in the proportion of population now using enhanced water and
sanitation services, “[m]ost of developing countries remain water insecure” as millions
still lack access to basic water and sanitation (UNESCO, 2015; World Bank, 2015;
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WWF, 2016). Hence, the goal of water security remains a priority post 2015 as part of
the new SDGs agenda, which envisions a world in which water becomes available for
all by 2030 (UNESCO, 2015).
These international initiatives arguably fall short in addressing the root causes of
water insecurity. The dominant approaches to water issues in the international
community seem to attribute the contemporary water crisis to scarcity in physical
resources, a problem better addressed through improving the efficiency of water
services, increasing technical and financial capacity, mitigating water-related risks
(OECD, 2013; Sadoff et al., 2015), and enhanced water management and governance
(OECD, 2013; Sadoff et al., 2015; World Bank, 2015). This perspective overlooks the
broader socio-economic forces provoking water scarcity, and hence fails to provide
lasting solutions. Critics of this approach argue that what we need is not just water
security, but also water justice.
At the core of the global water crisis, therefore, lie socio-economic inequalities.
Political ecologists argue that water scarcity is not necessarily the outcome of
environmental phenomena; rather, it is very much the result of economic and political
power differentials that determine who has access to and control of water resources
(Swyngedouw, 2009; Mascarenhas, 2012). Mascarenhas (2012) also attributes water
scarcity to poverty and injustice as he observes: “power, poverty, and inequality are at
the heart of today’s water crisis” (p. 52). As access to water, or lack thereof, remains
shaped by gender, race, religion, and social status (UNO-IDFA, 2015), vulnerable
populations will continue to bear the greatest burden of water scarcity until further
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opportunities of empowerment materialize (for more information about regions and
populations most suceptible to water insecurity, see Sadoff et al., 2015).

3.4 Governance
Unequal socio-economic power that results in water scarcity can take the form a
governance scheme that privileges some and marginalizes others. To some degree,
such failures are recognized in mainstream approaches to water security, the prevalent
water crisis being described as largely a “crisis of governance” (WWAP, 2006, p. 49). In
other words, the potential of water in generating prosperity is undermined given the
current inadequate, in many cases fragmented and undemocratic, governance
framework, which – if enhanced – can lead to improved service delivery (World Bank,
2015; WWAP, 2006, 2015). Additionally, governance is believed to be essential in
achieving integrated water resources management (IWRM) and limiting pollution of
freshwater systems (World Bank, 2015; WWAP, 2006), hence the targeting of water
governance in the SDGs (United Nations, 2015b). An effective water governance
framework, therefore, is seen to be one that leads to reaping maximum socio-economic
benefits as part of achieving greater global water security.
On the other hand, many scholars call attention to the shortcomings in
mainstream treatment of water governance. Castro (2007), for instance, notes that
within international institutional discourse, governance is deemed a mere instrument for
achieving specific social and economic goals; this, he argues, risks de-politicizing and
neutralizing water management by rendering the process purely technical. Instead,
governance should be looked at as a process that recognizes the role of social relations
(Castro, 2007). Castro further emphasizes the importance of reorienting water
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governance towards a more democratic approach that stems from concerns related to
sustainability and social justice rather than being reduced to technical fixes. This notion
of ‘water democracy’ is defined by Bakker (2007) as “decentralized, community-based,
democratic water management in which water conservation is politically, socioeconomically and culturally inspired rather than economically motivated" (p. 442).
While the mainstream worldview promotes a top-down approach to water
governance, where the role of the market remains vital, a democratic framework as put
forth by political ecologists embodies a grassroots approach that considers water first
and foremost a public good. Achieving a collective water democracy where the overall
societal interests are respected is believed to reduce the dire consequences of humanmade water scarcities.

3.5 The Potential and Limitations of the Right to Water
Around the turn of the century, global movements for water democracy became fixated
on the human right to water as a key lever for more just and inclusive water governance
schemes. In many cases, especially in Latin America, social mobilizations at the
grassroots level succeeded in achieving legal recognition of the right to water (Mottiar,
2011; Naidoo, Davidson-Hardin, & Harden, 2007; Perera, 2012; Sultana & Loftus, 2012),
though implementing this right proves to be a process that is at best protracted. In
response to these movements, the right to water was enshrined in the contstitutions of a
number of Latin American countries before it obtained global legal recognition alongside
other human rights. First, the UN General Assembly recognized “the right to safe and
clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full
enjoyment of life and all human rights” in its 2010 resolutions (A/RES/64/292, 2010).
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Later during the same year, the right to safe drinking water and sanitation was
incorporated in the Human Rights Council resolutions as well (A/HRC/RES/15/9, 2010).
Consequent to the growing involvement of local and global water justice activists
in the ‘right to water’ movement, scholars have cautioned that the ‘rights’ approach can
be limiting (Bakker, 2007; Castro, 2008; Linton, 2012; Sultana & Loftus, 2012). Using
the ‘right to water’ as a rallying cry by opponents of privatization overlooks the fact that
the term is not incompatible with the delivery of water services by private companies,
the strategies of which have often aggravated pre-existing injustices (Bakker, 2007;
Castro, 2008). Furthermore, the ‘right to water’ term bears the risk of being reduced to
the right to fixed quantities of water as opposed to signifying a broader notion of rights
that are associated with social equity and democratic participation in water-related
decisions (Bakker, 2005; Linton, 2012; Sultana & Loftus, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2009).
According to Linton (2012), the hegemonic notion of the ‘right to water’ ignores “the
social nature of humanity as well as the processual nature of water” (p. 48). Therefore,
alternate terms such as the ‘commons’ (Bakker, 2007; Shiva, 2002), ‘economies of
water,’ ‘cultures of water’ (Linton, 2012) and ‘water democracies’ (Castro, 2007) have
been suggested to refer to hydrosocial relationships that are democratic and inclusive,
where water is a public good governed by communities. In sum, the ‘right to water’
notion could be reductionist, vague, and one that doesn’t necessarily entail water justice.
Despite the problematic nature of the ‘right to water,’ Sultana and Loftus (2012)
argue that it can still be a powerful notion vis-à-vis other alternative terms. Legal
recognition of the right to water, they argue, can be effective in holding authorities
accountable, thus empowering marginalized communities and mobilizing social
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movements as demonstrated by water struggles in Bolivia, Uruguay, and Colombia
(Perera, 2012). Future debates should ensure that the ‘right to water’ moves beyond the
limitation of fixed quantities towards establishing water democracies where citizen
participation in decision-making is a fundamental right (Linton, 2012; Sultana & Loftus,
2012). Although legal and political recognition of the right to water continues to be
relevant, for the purpose of this thesis the notion of water justice offers a more
appropriate framework for addressing these issues and overcoming the limitations of
the former term.

4 Methodology
For my case study, I adopted two major methodological approaches: ethnography and
discourse analysis. The ethnographic approach involved in-depth semi-structured
interviews and non-participant observation. Data collected by means of the indicated
methods, in addition to reviewing various kinds of physical and digital documents,
informed the discourse analysis conducted afterwards. The following sections provide a
brief overview of the selected methods and field procedures.
Ethics clearance was obtained in May 2016, prior to the commencement of
fieldwork and recruitment of participants. To ensure the privacy and wellbeing of
participants, I used pseudonyms, coded field notes, restricted access to data, and kept
electronic notes on a laptop protected by a password. Potential risks to participants
were deemed minimal. All electronic and physical data will be disposed of as indicated
in the ethics contract post the completion of the project, anticipated to take place in
August 2017.
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4.1 Literature Review
4.1.1 Ethnographic Approach
Ethnography as a methodology is common within the social sciences (Hammersley &
Atkinson,

2007;

Hörschelmann

&

Stenning,

2008;

Wall,

2014)

due

to

its

interdisciplinarity and appropriateness for exploring “various kinds of social practices,
performances, or lived practices” (Scholl, Lahr-kurten, & Redepenning, 2016, p. 58).
Although traditionally time intensive (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007), ethnographic
research in its contemporary adaptations is often employed without extended periods of
time in the field (Wall, 2014), thus being appropriate for short-term qualitative research.
One such variation is focused ethnography, which is characterized by a specific
research question, short-term fieldwork, and intensive data collection (Wall, 2014).
Within an urban setting, this data is usually collected through interviews and nonparticipant observation (Jackson, 1985). Given both my familiarity with the context of the
selected case study and my interest in establishing profound understanding, focused
ethnography offers an appropriate methodology for intensively collecting data over the
two-month duration of my fieldwork.
4.1.2 In-depth Interviews
The purpose of interviews is to elicit responses and explore beliefs and motivations
through verbal exchange with the subjects of research (Dunn, 2005). Interviews can be
powerful in capturing varying perceptions and opinions about complex issues,
empowering otherwise marginalized voices, and uncovering meanings beyond the
scope of other methods, such as non-participant observation or surveys (Dunn, 2005).
According to Dunn (2005), “[i]nterviews are an excellent method of gaining access to
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information about events, opinions, and experiences” (p. 80). Furthermore, valuable
insights can be gained by paying attention to “not just what people tell you, but also how
they tell it” (Blommaert & Jie, 2010, p. 43, emphasis in original). This can be especially
informative for the discourse analysis approach used to analyze important aspects of
the data.
4.1.3 Non-participant Observation
On their own, interviews are insufficient in developing a profound understanding of the
lived experiences of the research participants and the meanings they associate with a
certain place – hence the need for a less formalized method of interaction between the
researcher and participants (Bell, 2013; Kearns, 2005). Moreover, data collected
through non-participant observation complements interviews such that it allows for a
better understanding of the social, political, and cultural context in which interviews take
place (Bell, 2013).
My research seeks to understand people’s perceptions and experiences, and the
particular discourses that shape their social realities related to water. Thus, it is
important to go beyond what has been said or written by looking also for silences, which
can be achieved through observing the social dynamics and contexts within which such
interactions take place. During my fieldwork, I observed dynamics in places such as
NGO offices, public spaces, and communities where water problems are manifest.
4.1.4 Discourse Analysis
Foucault’s theories about the role that language and knowledge production play in
shaping people’s realities dominate the discourse analysis methodology (Feindt & Oels,
2005; Waitt, 2005). According to Foucault, discourse is the sum of statements produced
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through the intertwining of power and knowledge to determine what beliefs are taken to
represent the ‘truth’, hence, shaping people’s practices and realities (Feindt & Oels,
2005; Waitt, 2005). Discourse, therefore, is a power mechanism that has the potential
not only to construct unjust realities, but also to have those realities viewed as inevitable
or even justified (Waitt, 2005). Consequently, the goal of discourse analysis is to
“understand how particular ideas are privileged as ‘truth’” (Waitt, 2005, p. 168), usually
through analyzing both textual and spoken material (Johnston, 2002). In other words,
the goal of discourse analysis is to understand what and why certain statements
circulate more widely than others, what beliefs are shaped by these statements, what
realities are constructed by those beliefs, and the power mechanisms manipulating the
whole process (Waitt, 2005).
Investigating discursive structures that produce and maintain inequalities is,
therefore, crucial to research with justice inclinations. Discourse analysis offers a
valuable vehicle for this purpose given that:
Environmental justice scholarship [needs] to actively work at its connections to
activism and its engagement with those at the sharp end of injustice, however it
is understood, and to bring theory to bear in meaningful ways into praxis and
diverse forms of public engagement (Holifield et al. cited in, Schlosberg, 2013, p.
50).
In sum, discourse analysis intersects with environmental justice in challenging
oppressive power structures (Johnston, 2002; Stanley, 2009), which is central to my
research. Sources typically analyzed include “manifestos, records of debates at
meetings, actions of political demonstrators, newspaper articles, slogans, speeches,
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posters, satirical prints, statutes of associations, pamphlets, and so on’ of a time, a
place, and a people” (Johnston, 2002, p. 67).

4.2 Data Collection and Analysis
For my study, I reviewed international reports, scholarly literature, a draft of Lebanese
Code de L’eau,1 governmental documents, informative brochures distributed by Tripoli’s
water office, Lebanese NGO and private sector documents, and Lebanese media
material related to the discourse about water in general and the ‘right to water’ in
particular. Understanding the contradicting notions of the ‘right to water’ among citizens,
government officials, private sector representatives, activists, and civil society actors
constitutes the basis for the discourse analysis of this study. Identifying the ongoing
debate around the ‘right to water’ in Lebanon helps in understanding what the term
means for different actors, how it is being used, and to what end.
The majority of the materials indicated above were accessible in Arabic, the
official language of the state. Aside from a few scholarly articles that were only available
in French, I encountered no limitations related to language. Many sources were
obtained through the Laurier Library, but others were only available from sources that I
contacted while in the field. A few of the research participants made reference to
documents that I was unable to access.
4.2.1 Interviews
Interviews were conducted with two categories of informants: (a) experts such as NGO
leaders, activists, academic researchers, representatives from the private sector, and
policy makers; and (b) residents of an urban neighbourhood. Interviews with experts
1

A proposed law that aims to encapsulate all currently-scattered water laws in Lebanon.
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sought to elicit perceptions and conceptualizations of the ‘right to water’ and ‘water
justice’ notions, the extent to which these concepts influence the work of civil society,
barriers that impede achieving water equity, and ways to increase the participation of
marginalized communities in designing solutions to the prevailing water crisis. On the
other hand, interviews with ordinary residents aimed to understand the coping
mechanisms and forms of agency available to them, that is, the ways in which
communities experience and respond to water injustices within the socio-economic
structure in place. I was not able to examine those coping strategies in much detail due
to the limited number of citizen-interviews I could secure. Yet I present in the coming
chapters information on social agency, which I gathered from other sources in an
attempt to achieve an adequate understanding of the overall situation of water access
within Tripoli. The limited data I acquired in that regard led me to modify my approach to
the analysis phase by focusing less on hydrosocial agency and more on the dynamics
of civil society as I sought explanations to the lack of mass mobilizations around water
problems.
Participant Recruitment
Fieldwork took place over the course of two months. I corresponded with several local
researchers before going into the field in order to gain insights about potential research
participants and ideas about the lines of questioning I hoped to pursue. Those
researchers were the first point of contact upon my arrival into the field. Purposeful,
snowball sampling was used to recruit expert informant participants in order to ensure
the relevance of the interviewees’ input to the study. Residents, on the other hand, were
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randomly selected based on (a) the socio-economic condition of their neighbourhoods,
and (b) availability. No reimbursement was provided.
Sample and Participant Profiles
I conducted a total of 23 interviews, of which 20 were with expert informants and 3 with
residents. The expert informant interviews could be further broken down into 3 with
government officials, 4 with academic researchers, one interview with 3 representatives
of the corporate sector, and 10 with activists and/or NGO representatives. The
interviewees were selected based on their expertise in the water sector, their
involvement in water-related initiatives, or – more broadly – their involvement in
advocacy campaigns that indirectly relate to the concept of water justice. Participants
varied in age and gender; 8 were females and 15 males, all of them above 18 years old.
Table 1 below provides a brief overview of the research participants. Only participants
who consented to have their real names used have been identified using full names.
Table 1: Participant Profiles

Category

Participant Identification
Christéle Allès
Karim-Phillip EidSabbagh

Academics
Jalal Halawani
Rania Masri
Hosn Khalaf
Civil Society
K.S.
Representatives
Samer Annous

Occupation
Researcher at Université de Nantes,
Institut de Geographie et D'Amenagement
Regional de L'Un
PhD, academic researcher specializing in
development studies & political economy.
Previously at the Asfari Institute at the AUB
Head of the Department of Health and
Environment, Lebanese University
Associate director at the Asfari Institute for
Civil Society and Citizenship, American
University of Beirut (AUB)
Social activist and previous member of the
Friends of Water Association (FWA), Tripoli
Previous member of the FWA, Tripoli
Academic, independent activist, and leader
of the Civic Mobilization Network in Tripoli
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Nariman Shamaa
Ali Darwish
Nasser Nasrallah
A.A.
Chadi Nachabe
Shafik AbdulRahman
Omar Asaad
George Akl
Corporate
Salah Saliba
Sector
Representatives
Bassam Jaber
Maher Tahsaldar
Government
Officials

Citizens

D.S.
Ziad Hayek
Citizens 1; 2; 3

Activist, president of Donia for Sustainable
Development, and president of the
Committee for Monitoring Tripoli’s Projects
Activist, researcher, & president of Green
Line NGO, based in Beirut
President of Ibrahim Abd Al-Al Foundation,
based in Beirut
Representative of Nahnoo, based in Beirut
President of Utopia. Politician & municipal
councillor
Program manager at Utopia, Tripoli
Representative of Utopia, Tripoli
Deputy Chief of Party at Development
Alternatives Inc. (DAI), Lebanon Water
Project (LWP), USAID Contractor2
USAID Private Sector Engagement Team
Lead at DAI LWP, USAID Contractor
Water expert. Consultant for DAI LWP,
USAID Contractor. Former Director of
Exploitation, Ministry of Energy and Water
Head of the Department of Accountancy,
North Lebanon Water Establishment (WE).
Instructor at the College of Business
Administration, Lebanese University
Employee in the North Lebanon WE
Secretary General of the Higher Council for
Privatization of the Republic of Lebanon
Two housewives, one not determined

While most interviewees agreed to have their interviews recorded, a few refused,
mainly due to workplace policies that prohibit recordings or for anonymity concerns.
Interviews with expert informants lasted for an average of 45 to 60 minutes each, while
those with residents were significantly shorter, each about 10 minutes long. The
majority of expert informant interviews were one-on-one, but a few were conducted with
2 or 3 other individuals at the same time (at the request of participants). I adopted a
semi-structured approach to ensure that the questions I originally set out to investigate
2

The views of Akl, Saliba, and Jaber are their own and do not represent those of USAID.
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were addressed, while allowing for flexibility in incorporating emerging themes not
previously identified. A semi-structured approach also helped reduce formality and
establish rapport with informants (Dunn, 2005).
All 3 residents lived in what would be considered marginalized neighbourhoods in
Tripoli. I met with 2 of them in their area of residence following my visit to the Hawuz, a
public water fountain. There, I observed residents filling their water tanks from the public
fountain and approached a few. One of the bystanders was affiliated with a local
familial-based NGO, and he liaised with the community to secure the 2 meetings
mentioned. The interviews were marked by the non-stop passage of bystanders and
interrupted by occasional exchanges with neighbours. I met with the third citizen in the
office of one of the NGOs that works in the resident’s neighbourhood.3
Ten of the expert informant interviewees were based in Tripoli, and the rest in
Beirut. Even though my intention was to focus on Tripoli, I had to expand my area of
investigation to Beirut for a number of reasons. First, the centralized nature of policymaking means that certain important decision-making happens in the capital. Second,
Beirut is the most vital urban centre, where much of urban activities and development
projects take place. It hosts a variety of NGOs that work on a diverse range of causes
throughout Lebanon. Third, the water sector in Beirut suffers from major problems;
certain areas have witnessed water rationing lasting for a period of four consecutive
weeks in 2016. This means that Beirut is a fertile ground for the emergence of social
mobilizations around water. Finally, Beirut has recently witnessed a broad-based social

3

The NGO turned down my request to meet in the citizen’s area of residence lest my presence
might lead others in the neighbourhood to mistakenly expect potential development projects.
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movement in response to the waste crisis (see Chapter IV), where no such examples
were available in Tripoli.
Data collected from interviews was based on accurate and comprehensive field
notes that I diligently typed up right after each session, referring to the recordings
(where available) to jog my memory for details. Four interviews were transcribed
verbatim. During the composition of field notes and the transcription phase, emerging
themes were directly noted in a separate document. After the preliminary themes had
been identified, data collected from the interviews was thematically categorized and
added to this document. The thematic categories formed the basis for structuring the
chapters and subsections of the thesis.
4.2.2 Limitations
Originally, I had intended to interview a larger number of ordinary citizens residing in
marginalized areas. This, however, was not feasible due to the lack of personal
connections, potential security risks in some cases, and the time factor. The two months
period of fieldwork proved inadequate for establishing meaningful relationships that
would have facilitated accessing certain segments of the population. While the data
collected from the 3 interviews with householders is of limited utility, it does point to the
necessity of further research in this direction. Furthermore, I tried to compensate for this
shortfall through non-participant observation and through putting together pieces of
information collected during interviews with participants from other categories. Indeed,
interviews with water experts and NGO representatives provided information – based on
first-hand experiences and long-term expertise – about how households meet their
needs of water. The overall picture of water access in Tripoli that I have attempted to
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construct in Chapter III, while not based on intensive personal interviews with citizens, is
based on multiple sources of information (e.g. governmental publications, international
reports, scholarly research, and interviews with experts and NGO representatives),
which I often found to be in congruence.

29

Chapter II: Context of Tripoli, Lebanon
1 Historical and Political Context
Tripoli (see Figure 2), the second largest city in Lebanon, sits on the Mediterranean Sea
85 km northeast of Beirut. Since its foundation in the 3rd century BCE by the
Phoenicians, 4 Tripoli has seen the rise and fall of several empires including the
Mamluks, Crusaders, Romans, Ottomans, and more recently the French.

Figure 2: Map of Tripoli (Source: ArcGIS Online)

1.1 Emergence of modern Tripoli
Modern Tripoli emerged in the 16th century during the Ottoman Empire’s rule over what
is now called the Middle East (Einav, 2015). Due to its strategic location and topography,

4

Various speculations about the date of the first settlement in Tripoli exist. Ginzarly and Teller
(2016) suggest that Tripoli was founded in the 14th century BCE.

30

Tripoli became the main port of Syria’s coast and attained distinguished status as a
centre of the Ottoman Provincial administration. It emerged as an industrial and
commercial site. Tripoli is believed to have been a living example of plurality, tolerance,
and acceptance as different sects co-existed alongside each other in harmony (see
Reilly, 2016 for an overview of historical analyses).

1.2 French Colonialism and the Birth of Greater Lebanon
The period of French colonialism spelled the beginning of Tripoli’s decline, starting with
the birth of Greater Lebanon in 1920. During the demarcation of France’s colonial
territories, Tripoli was unwillingly separated from the Province of Syria and made part of
the Province of Beirut, subsequently becoming part of the new state of Lebanon. The
latter was not well received by Tripolitalians, “who saw themselves as an integral part of
Greater Syria and not of the new state established in the spirit of the Maronite
Christians and their French patrons” (Einav, 2015, p. 29). Under the new territorial
arrangements, Beirut was given more importance, and as its status as an emerging
cultural, political, and economic centre prospered, Tripoli’s declined further. Khaled
Ziade interprets this process as part of a broader trend of the retraction of the Islamic
city in the face of the Western model portrayed by Beirut (Reilly, 2016). The tension
between Tripoli and Beirut continued until after independence. Abd al-Ghani Imad
argues that the residents of Tripoli associated themselves even more firmly with
Arabism and conservative Islam as a means to express their alienation and to cultivate
an identity separate from Western-spirited Beirut (Reilly, 2016). The Arab-Islamic
orientation continues to characterize the identity of Tripoli to this day (Abi Samra, 2015).
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1.3 Post-independence
Upon the end of French colonialism in 1943, subsequent political waves swept over
Tripoli including Pan-Arabism (Nasserism) in the 1950s, communism, and Islamist
movements. The history of Tripoli and the rest of Lebanon forever changed with the
outbreak of the civil war in 1975. Tripoli became a site for active military conflicts, which
left permanent damage to the pre-existing harmony and cultural ideals of acceptance
and peaceful co-existence.5 One fruit of the civil war was the armed dispute between
two of Tripoli’s poorest neighbourhoods: Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen; the violence has
persisted ever since.
In 1985, Syrian troops entered Lebanon to end the civil war, thus marking the
beginning of the era of direct intervention of the Syrian regime in Lebanon’s internal
affairs. Gade argues that the “internal solidarity” that prevailed among the residents and
political leaders of Tripoli around anti-imperialism and traditional social norms ceased
upon the intervention of al-Assad’s regime (Gade, 2015, p. 20). The latter’s direct
involvement intensified clientelism such that client-patron relations between Lebanese
political leaders and Syrian military leaders in Lebanon became prominent. Those with
strong ties with Syrian authorities inevitably attained more clout.

2 Socio-economic conditions
2.1 Social makeup
Tripoli is the second largest urban centre in the country, with a population reaching
nearly half a million. The social makeup consists of a Sunni majority, Christians, and
5

With the exception of the town of Mina, where Muslim Sunnis and Orthodox Christians
refrained from engaging in sectorial conflicts during the civil war – aside from a few outlier
incidents; both populations continue to live alongside each other (Touma, 2015).
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Alawis. Sunnis represent 81% of the population, whereas Alawis constitute 9% (Gade,
2015). The majority of the Alawi population in Lebanon resides in the neighbourhood of
Jabal Mohsen. Finally, Christians, further identifying as Greek Orthodox, Maronite,
Armenian, and Melkite Greek Catholic, make up 11%.6 Tripoli also hosts around 70,000
Syrian refugees (Kabalan, 2016), the majority of whom gravitated towards areas of the
city that are predominantly alike in religious terms (Mercy Corps, 2013).

2.2 Economy
Prior to Tripoli’s integration into the State of Lebanon, it served as a port for Syria’s
inner cities. As its role as a major port declined, it became involved in the refining
industry of Iraqi crude oil (Information International SAL, 2001). The main refinery was
damaged due to several successive conflicts and is now non-functional (Information
International SAL, 2001). Even after the decline of Tripoli’s status as a main port, its
economy has continued to be strongly connected to that of Syria. Tripoli also serves as
a market for the produce of surrounding agricultural plains (Information International
SAL, 2001).
In addition to oil storage and refining, trades that flourished in Tripoli include the
processing of fruit and tobacco, soap manufacturing, fishing, and other artisanal crafts
(Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d.). Many of the traditional trades have vanished as a result
of the modernization process, although some of them are currently seeing a revival
(Information International SAL, 2001). As large-scale development projects in the area
are lacking, the economy of contemporary Tripoli depends mainly on small business
enterprises (Information International SAL, 2001). The most prominent is the food
6

Statistics vary by source.
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industry e.g. Arabic sweet manufacturers, dairy and poultry factories, pastries,
restaurants, and street vendors. Other businesses include bookstores, consumer shops,
and furniture making in addition to a number of surviving traditional crafts such as
fishing, Arabic medicine and spice trades, perfumeries, soap manufacturing,
shoemaking, wood making, and coppersmiths (Information International SAL, 2001).
Although Tripoli could potentially serve as an important tourist attraction due to its rich
historical and cultural heritage, tourism is weak because of the beleaguered state of the
city’s infrastructure and the ongoing political instability.

2.3 Living Conditions
Questions of water justice, the core of this research, necessitate discussing the
underlying socio-economic structures that (re)produce and perpetuate injustices. In fact,
the UN considers poverty an immediate cause of social and environmental inequalities
that further undermine the ability of affected populations to access resources and fully
enjoy their rights (Kukrety, Oxfam, & AUB, 2016).
While the influx of refugees, many of who now reside in impoverished
neighbourhoods, has exacerbated the already precarious living conditions in Tripoli, the
refugee crisis is not the root cause of prevailing political and economic problems in the
city. Even prior to the Syrian conflict, poverty and deprivation levels were significantly
high. Based on data collected in 2004 as part of a study on the poverty in Lebanon,
Tripoli scored the second highest in poverty rates (for a comprehensive assessment,
see Laithy, Abu-Ismail, & Hamdan, 2008). Another study conducted by UN-ESCWA and
the Arab Development Institute, led by Adib Nehmeh (2010), identified 57% of the
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households in Tripoli as deprived, and 26% as severely deprived.7 Of the 7 districts in
Tripoli, 4 are considered deprived, in which case the percentage of deprived households
surpasses the city’s average of 57% (Nehmeh, 2010). Nehmeh thus concludes that it is
more accurate to describe Tripoli not as an urban centre with poverty enclaves, but
rather as an impoverished city with sparse pockets of affluence.
Within

Tripoli

itself,

noticeable

disparities

exist

between

wealthy

and

impoverished suburbs, where segregation is primarily based on social class. Sharper
than the concentration of poverty in marginalized neighbourhoods is the concentration
of wealth in their affluent counterparts (Nehmeh, 2010). Such disparities reflect a wider
pattern of territorial differential of access to rights and resources, which is fundamental
to the Lebanese socio-political structure.

2.4 Repercussions of the Syrian crisis
The repercussions of the Syrian civil war have been immediately reflected in Tripoli,
leading to economic and political pressures.
2.4.1 Economic impacts
The economic impacts of the Syrian crisis arise in at least two processes, (a) the
consequent deterioration of an economic relationship with Syria, and (b) the internal
competition for scarce resources as a result of the influx of refugees. The living
conditions in some neighbourhoods that host Syrian refugees in Tripoli, specifically
7

The study defines poor families as those whose lifestyle falls below the socially accepted
standard of living that is necessary to satisfy basic needs essential for leading a dignified life;
this standard is usually determined through social norms in the area of residence (Nehmeh,
2010). The Urban Deprivation Index (UDI) was used to measure socio-economic deprivation.
The UDI comprises of four categories: education level, economic conditions, housing, and
health insurance. The indicators were used to identify the degree of household deprivation of
basic needs, resources, capabilities, and rights.
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Tabbaneh, are equally precarious for both the local communities and the refugees alike
(Kukrety et al., 2016). This also has social implications that manifest in growing
animosity towards the displaced Syrians.
2.4.2 Political impact
The increased tension in areas with high concentrations of Syrian refugees is only partly
the result of increased economic pressures. It is also the outcome of trans-national
political complications resulting from the longstanding ties between Tripoli and Syria
(Einav, 2015). First, the crisis in Syria initiated armed conflicts across the SyrianLebanese border. Second, it refuelled the chronic local conflict between two of Tripoli’s
poorest neighbourhoods: Tabbaneh dominated by the Sunni sect; and Jabal Mohsen,
inhabited by the Alawi sect. The ongoing civil unrest stems out of the deeper conflicting
political positions between proponents (Alawis) and opponents (Sunnis) of the Syrian
regime. While the conflict takes a sectarian tint, it is underpinned and fueled by political
agendas set by dominant warlords. Such clashes create an atmosphere of fear among
local communities and refugees alike, and compromise their safety (UNOCHA and
REACH, 2014).

2.5 Marginalization
Citizens of Tripoli believe they have been purposefully neglected by the state. It is not
uncommon to hear echoes of discourse about Tripoli being a “forgotten city”, “neglected
city”, and “marginalized city” in daily conversations, social media, newspaper articles
(see, for example, Abi Samra, 2015; Abouzaki, 2012; Derbas, 2015), and scholarly
studies (Laithy et al., 2008; Nehmeh, 2010). Such expressions reveal an underlying
feeling of discrimination shared among the residents of Tripoli. To date, Tripoli and the
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Northern governorate in general remain underserved in the eyes of the public (Abouzaki,
2012; MoSA & UNDP, 2007).
Several studies and political figures confirm this observation. For instance, the
Social Affairs Minister and native of Tripoli, Rashid Derbas, states that Tripoli “has
suffered from chronic marginalization and deprivation” (Derbas, 2015, p. 20). Similarly,
Charbel Nahas, previous Labour Minister, reports that Tripoli has been historically
neglected by the state, which had not taken measures to develop the city’s fragile
economy that was already exhausted by the long years of the civil war (Abouzaki, 2012).
Some scholars (Imad, 2002) and journalists (Abi Samra, 2015) believe that the strategic
deprivation appears to be a form of punishment for Tripoli’s troubled relation with the
state since the latter’s formation, and for its stronger affiliation with the principles of
Arabism and Islamism than with those of a secular state. Feelings of persecution are
further entrenched given the recurring militant tensions between different factions with
armed forces (Einav, 2015).
This perceived neglect by the state may be explained by the territorialisation of
power and resources. On a political level, an increased number of Sunnis believe they
have been given a marginal role in the political process (Lefèvre, 2014). On an
economic level, Sunnis also believe that the Sunni sect shoulders the highest burden of
socio-economic disparities (Lefèvre, 2014). Moreover, current policies dictate that voting
happen based on the town of origin rather than of residence. For instance, those who
are eligible to vote in certain districts within Tripoli, namely the old city centre, reach at
best 10-15% of the total residents (Information International SAL, 2001). Thus, a large
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segment of the population lacks political representation and the interests of Tripoli are
neither represented nor addressed.
The absence of a strong state necessitates devising alternative routes for
accessing services. First, it gives way to the increasing role of NGOs as substitute
service providers (Darwish, 2004). The preoccupation of NGOs with service provision
undermines their ability to advocate for rights, including the right to water. This is
examined in further detail in Chapter III. Second, the persistent political crisis reinforces
and legitimizes patron-client relations within political parties linked to the country’s
sectarian factions, also discussed in a later chapter of this paper.
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Chapter III: The right to water in Tripoli,
Lebanon
In this chapter I investigate the notion of the right to water in the context of Tripoli. I start
with an overview of the legal history of the right to water in Lebanon and the current
national governance scheme. Then I explore more closely the state of affairs with
respect to the right to water, that is, patterns of (in)access to water, at the level of Tripoli
given the city’s specific hydrosocial configuration. Finally, I present and discuss my
fieldwork findings, focusing on the participants’ perspectives on the right to water, its
meaning, and mechanisms of realization to depict an approximate picture of the overall
public discourse.

1 Legal Context of The Right to Water
1.1 Historical Perspective
Inspired by religious beliefs that view water as sacred and essential to all forms of life,
the right to water has existed since ancient times in Lebanon. Customary laws
acknowledged two major rights derived from Sharia: haq al-shafa (the right to drink),
and haq al-ray (the right to irrigate and water livestock) (Ghiotti & Riachi, 2013; Makdisi,
2007). The word Sharia itself, conventionally referring to Islamic law, linguistically
indicates the path to the water spring; it then means both the path to water and water
law (Naff, 2009). Both haq al-shafa and haq al-ray were stipulated in the Medjellé, the
Ottoman Civil Code, which was created in 1875 based on the juxtaposition of the
French Civil Code, Sharia law, and customary laws (Ghiotti & Riachi, 2013). Thus, the
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Medjellé, customs, and an established system of concessions constituted the regulatory
framework for water use (Ghiotti & Riachi, 2013).
Other existing common proverbs during the Ottoman period that reflect the social
acceptance of the right to water and the nature of water as a common resource include:
“people are partners in three: water, pasture, and fire” (B. Jaber, personal
communication, 2016). Another common proverb was that “water shall not bypass a
thirsty person” (B. Jaber, personal communication, 2016). Based on this belief, no one
could claim the ownership over water, and establishments were prohibited from denying
water to anyone on the premise of water scarcity, unless technical difficulties were
involved (B. Jaber, personal communication, 2016).
During the French mandate from 1920 to 1943, two major laws were enacted to
regulate the water sector. Decree 144 stipulates water as a public domain belonging to
the state, and decree 320 dictates the protection of public water including groundwater.
Water rights as prescribed in the Ottoman and French legal provisions, as well as many
of the usufruct rights to water acquired during that period, remain in effect today.

1.2 Contemporary Laws
The historical recognition of water as a sacred right inspired by religion and culture
continues to penetrate the consciousness of contemporary Lebanese society. As
Makdisi (2007) argues, the right to water is also politically accepted such that “no
Lebanese politician or policymaker would publicly deny that the right of every citizen to
clean water is sacred, part of Lebanese custom, culture, religion and ultimately a state
responsibility” (p. 374). Yet this political acceptance fails to translate into mechanisms
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through which the right to water could be legally granted (Makdisi, 2007). Moreover,
what this right actually means remains vague.
Based on the still-effective Medjellé code, decree 144, and decree 320, water is
considered a public domain that can be neither sold nor owned; exceptions to this
include rainwater that is collected by individuals, acquired rights to water issued pre1925, or water resources existing on private land so long as the extracted amount does
not exceed 100 m3/day (Makdisi, 2007). In 2000 the water sector witnessed a major
reform since independence. The reform did not, however, explicitly stipulate the right to
water as a legal right. In effect, water laws and regulations have remained scattered,
ambiguous, and conflicting (B. Jaber, personal communication, 2016). In an attempt to
address this ambiguity and confusion, a water law that encompasses all water laws was
proposed in 2005.
1.2.1 Code de L’eau
Code de L’eau was prepared in 2005 by the MoEW and financed by the Agence
Française de Développement (AFD). It was to serve as a comprehensive water law to
update the pre-existing, out-dated water laws and resolve the fragmentation of
responsibilities across multiple bodies (The Republic of Lebanon, 2005). Code de L’eau
is considered the first legal recognition of the right to water such that “water as a right
was stated for the first time” (B. Jaber, personal communication, 2016). It further
maintains the essence of pre-existing laws, where water is considered a public domain
and water provision is overseen by the state (B. Jaber, personal communication, 2016).
Clause #5 of Code de L’eau stipulates the right of every citizen to obtain enough water
to cover basic needs for maintaining a dignified life (The Republic of Lebanon, 2005, p.
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13). In return, citizens are required to pay a tariff specified by each regional water
establishment to cover the costs of water service; the tariff is to be consumption-based,
and should consider the socio-economic circumstances of the beneficiaries (The
Republic of Lebanon, 2005, p. 30). Nevertheless, some of the law provisions are vague.
For example, while clause #5 enshrines the right of every citizen to a quantity of water
enough to satisfy basic needs, it does not specify what this minimum basic amount
should be.
To date, Code de L’eau remains a legislative proposal, without active political
processes to move it forward (B. Jaber, personal communication, 2016). Thus, besides
the customary recognition of the right to water, no legal instrument exists to ensure its
material realization. Expanding on this scenario, Makdisi explains that the discrepancy
between the general acceptance of the right to water, on the one hand, and the lack of
concrete law and regulations to protect that right, on the other, is due to four major
constraints: (a) lack of political will, (b) lack of capacity, (c) transboundary water security,
and (d) pressures for the neoliberalization of the water sector, which have been present
at least since the turn of the century (for a thorough analysis of the four factors refer to
Makdisi, 2007, p. 382). The next section explores some of these constraints in relation
to water governance.

2 Governance Scheme of the Water Sector
The current governance framework is informed by the codes and laws established
during the Ottoman ruling period and the French mandate (see Appendix B for a list of
effective water laws) (ECODIT, 2015; Farajalla, Kerkezian, Farhat, El Hajj, & Matta,
2015; Makdisi, 2007; MOE, UNDP, & ECODIT, 2011). In 2000, a major administrative
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reform of the water sector took place. It encouraged the commercialization of water
establishments, increased participation of stakeholders, adoption of integrated water
resources management (IWRM) practices, and decentralization of water governance
(Allès, 2012).
The reform was a precondition, required by international and bilateral lenders
and aid agencies, for receiving international funds to rehabilitate the damaged water
infrastructure after the civil war (Allès, 2012). Rehabilitation and development projects
were financed by international funds in the form of loans and grants, namely through the
World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the
European Union as well as French, Italian, German, Japanese, and Arab governments
and agencies (Darwish, 2004). This raises questions of the political influence of
international actors on the policymaking process (Eid-Sabbagh, 2014). Despite this
influence, implemented projects lacked clear planning and were not immune to local
political influence such that they were often executed according to the political interests
of the elite rather than national concerns (Darwish, 2004). Through maintaining control
over financial and administrative bodies, the elite are able to sabotage internationallyinspired policy reforms and development projects that fail to align with their interests
(Eid-Sabbagh, 2014).
Prior to 2000, water was governed by the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW)
in addition to 21 regional water authorities and 200 local committees (ECODIT, 2015;
Farajalla et al., 2015; Makdisi, 2007; MOE et al., 2011). With the introduction of law 221
in

2000,

however,

governance

was

decentralized

to

four

Regional

Water

Establishments (RWEs) (Makdisi, 2007). Accordingly, the water sector is governed by
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the MoEW in addition to the recently established RWEs, with supposedly more
autonomy granted to the latter. It should be noted that the rearranged governance
structure is sometimes described as “decentralized” (Allès, 2012; Makdisi, 2007), and
other times as “centralized” (Allès & Brochier-Puig, 2013; MOE et al., 2011). The reform
can be seen as decentralization given the increased devolution of responsibilities to the
regional RWEs. Yet it can also be considered as regional centralization in the sense
that (a) four regional RWEs replaced the 21 water offices and local 200+ committees
that traditionally oversaw water affairs; and (b) the new regional RWEs have limited
autonomy as the MoEW continues to be largely involved in the management of the
water sector. Another aim of the administrative reform was to lay the foundation for the
increased involvement of the private sector in water management through promoting the
commercialization of the water sector. As we will see below, this aim was not fully
implemented.
Despite the reform, water governance and legislation continues to be fragmented
across several institutions and governmental bodies, with their roles poorly coordinated
and often overlapping (Abbas & Lovett, 2014; Farajalla et al., 2015; MoEW, 2012;
OECD, 2010; World Bank, 2010). Eid-Sabbagh identifies four categories of actors
involved directly or indirectly in the water governance process. The main influencers
include the MoEW and RWEs, followed by other ministries, municipalities, and
legislative bodies (see Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 in Appendix A for more
information about relevant actors). In addition to the lack of financial and administrative
capacity of the water management entities, water governance is further complicated by
political influence from local leaders, especially given the prevalence of clientelism,
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corruption, and lax law enforcement (Abbas & Lovett, 2014; Farajalla et al., 2015;
MoEW, 2012; OECD, 2010; World Bank, 2010).

2.1 A Shift Towards a Neoliberalized Water Sector
A mainstream neoliberal agenda, of which the reformed water sector was part, is
promoted in Lebanon. As numerous scholars have noted, one key dimension of
neoliberal discourse around water is to naturalize the notion of scarcity as the key issue
to be resolved. A discourse of water scarcity is found in governmental reports such that
the factors undermining adequate water quality and quantity are identified as
“population growth and age structure, urbanization, economic growth and, more recently,
climate change” (MOE et al., 2011, p. 53). In response to the anticipated scarcity and
based on a discourse of technological fixes, the MoEW launched a 10-year plan in the
late 1990s, proposing the construction of 17 dams throughout the country to harvest an
additional 650 million m3 (MOE et al., 2011). The plan also aimed to address
wastewater issues and implement several irrigation and potable water ventures (Makdisi,
2007). The project was to be completed by 2010, but only one dam has been
established since then (MOE et al., 2011). A report published by the Ministry of
Environment (MOE) views the completed dam of Chabrouh as “a much-needed water
reservoir for the upper Kesrouan region [which] should serve as a case study for future
dam projects in the country” (MOE et al., 2011, p. 75).
Other examples of incomplete initiatives include, more recently, the National
Water Sector Strategy (NWSS) proposed in 2010. The NWSS came as a reproduction
of the 10-year plan (Eid-Sabbagh, 2014), emerging out of the collaboration between
national stakeholders and international agencies such as the German Development
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Cooperation (through GIZ), the World Bank, USAID, and others (MoEW, 2012). It
aspires to address the projected increase in demand by reshaping the water sector and
addressing its managerial and technical failures through dam construction, institutional
reforms, the adoption of IWRM practices, and private sector involvement (MOE et al.,
2011). Despite its ambitious aspirations, progress towards implementation of the
strategy is very slow (El-Jisr & Chabarekh, 2012). With respect to the NWSS’s embrace
of the IWRM approach, several factors hinder its implementation as there is “not enough
devolution to the regional water authorities to facilitate integrated basin level
management”, and “the approach remains top-down centralised decision making” (MOE
et al., 2011, p. 81). There is little faith that this strategy will be successfully implemented,
and no good reasons to believe otherwise; as one participant put it: “It is really just a
marketing tool. Nothing has been implemented and it is all a lie” (D.S., personal
communication, 2016). Also, the numerous newly-built wastewater plants in various
cities remain non-operational, as raw sewage continues to contaminate surface and
groundwater (MOE et al., 2011).

2.2 Involvement of the Private Sector
The 221/2000 reform facilitated the commercialization of the water sector, leading to the
establishment of the first public-private partnership (PPP) in Lebanon. Funded by AFD
and contracted to Ondeo-Liban, which is a subsidiary firm affiliated with SuezEnvironment, the PPP was established in 2003 to improve the quality of water services
in Tripoli (Allès, 2012; ECODIT, 2015; Yamout & Jamali, 2007). Some of the successes
this initiative has achieved are evident in the increased efficiency and continuity of water
services in Tripoli, which enjoys better water supply than other areas (Allès, 2012;
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ECODIT, 2015; OECD, 2010; World Bank, 2010). The contract was discontinued,
however, in 2007 due to political complications and the lack of a clear regulatory
framework for PPPs in Lebanese law (Masri, 2015; OECD, 2010).
Another recent initiative that illustrates the push for privatization in Lebanon is the
recent Blue Gold Campaign. Proposed by the Civic Influence Hub (CIH), an
organization founded by notable businessmen to promote economic and social
development, the 5-year Blue Gold plan aims to increase water availability to 500 million
m3 by 2020, and to one billion m3 by 2030 (CIH, 2013). This is to be done through
increasing water harvesting, optimizing water demand, enhancing water quality, and
implementing institutional reforms (CIH, 2013). Along the same lines, the Higher Council
for Privatization has been advocating for a legislation that aims to facilitate and regulate
PPPs, which, if implemented, will extend to the water sector (Z. Hayek, personal
communication, 2016). Hayek, the Secretary General, indicated that the legislation
attempts to achieve transparency and better governance by altering the current
dynamics of power; it embodies a real partnership between all stakeholders: the private
sector, ministries, municipalities, and civil society. The legislation has not been
approved by the Council of Ministers due to political complexities (Z. Hayek, personal
communication, 2016).
The water sector is also marked by an increased influence of private vendors.
The inadequacy of the public network in meeting the needs of citizens along with the
lack of trust in public water gave way to the increased involvement of private vendors,
many of whom lack legal accreditation or official licensing (World Bank, 2010). The
Ministry of Health reported that only 38 out of several hundreds bottling plants are
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licensed (ECODIT, 2015). The water private sector remains largely unregulated yet
critically influential given its dominance in the water market (MOE et al., 2011; World
Bank, 2010).
Despite the pernicious effects of an unregulated bottled water industry, several
participants believe that the private sector could have a positive role to play. As many
would argue, the strategic involvement of the private sector could prove effective for
improving water supply and relieving some of the current cost burden associated with
obtaining bottled water (S. Saliba, and Z. Hayek, personal communication, 2016). The
careful involvement of the private sector through management contracts and service
provision, for example, may represent a move towards better accessibility to and
affordability of water (S. Saliba, personal communication, 2016). Some observers close
to decision-making processes see privatization as a potential solution to some of the
governance issues in Lebanon. For engaging the private sector could be a strategy to
combat the clientelism and corruption prevalent within governmental bodies, in other
words, a way for developing public institutions independent from the elite's interests as
suggested by the World Bank (Allès, 2012). In this sense, “the Ondeo experiment could
then be seen as a process of state territorialisation facing competing territorialisations
led by local elites” (Allès, 2012, p. 397).8
Yet Salah Saliba9 cautions that engaging the private sector is a “tricky matter”
because it requires a strong state, good governance, transparency, and regulation
(personal communication, 2016). These conditions are lacking within Lebanese politics.
Ziad Hayek acknowledged the risks that may accompany the implementation PPPs,
8

Referencing Verdeil.
Saliba is the Private Sector Engagement Team Leader of the Lebanon Water Program (LWP)
at the Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), which is affiliated with USAID.
9
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especially that the experience of PPPs worldwide has produced mixed results, both
positive and negative, and thus has to be approached “with a lot of care” (personal
communication, 2016). Additionally, engaging private firms in the management of the
water sector is particularly risky given the failed privatization initiatives of the electricity
and telecommunication sectors. According to Allès (2012), "past experiments with
privatization in Lebanon have often been perceived as serving the commercial and
political interests of the ruling elites of the country, especially the former prime minister
Rafik Hariri and his entourage” (p. 397).10
As shown in this section, governmental experts recognize the ineffective
governance and legislative structure of the water sector as an impediment to a
functional water sector. Yet this recognition takes place within a mainstream neoliberal
discourse that advances the involvement of the private sector as a solution. Given the
absence of the preconditions for a successful privatization initiative that also protects
the rights of citizens, as well as the failed precedents of privatizing the electricity and
telecommunication sectors, serious concerns arise about the potential success of
involving the private sector in the management of water affairs. As Allès (2012) argues,
privatization projects, especially those undertaken by international companies that are
detached from the local context, should be studied against the particular political
economic situation within which they are intended to occur.

3 Current State of The Right to Water in Tripoli
From the preceding assessment, it is clear that the water sector suffers from technical,
financial, institutional, political, and administrative failures that undermine the realization
10

Referencing Leenders.
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of the human right to water. Problems range from the fragile infrastructure, legal
ambiguities, lax enforcement, depletion of water resources, public debt, and lack of
capacity of the RWEs, to political complications such as corruption, clientelism, and a
lack of political will to address water issues (Darwish, 2004; Eid-Sabbagh, 2014;
Farajalla et al., 2015; Makdisi, 2007). Thus, despite the customary and political
acceptance of the right to water, it remains inaccessible to certain segments of the
population. This also remains true in the case of Tripoli in spite of the advances
achieved through the Ondeo-Liban PPP as shall be shown in the next section.
Accurate and up-to-date data on water availability, accessibility, and patterns of
demand and consumption by regions is lacking for Lebanon. Estimates of water
connection rates, demand, and usage at the national level exist, yet they vary across
different reports, presenting challenges to constructing a cohesive picture in the
sections that follow. Available information dates back to the period prior to the outbreak
of the Syrian civil war in 2011 (see, for instance, Republic of Lebanon & UNDP, 2013).
Since then, the majority of recent international reports have assessed water and
sanitation conditions in relation to Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities
(ACTED, 2012). Given the lack of similar statistics at the level of Tripoli, I am compelled
to use the available data on the national trends of water demand and consumption to
provide an approximation. Needless to say, there is much room for error here and these
numbers should be viewed with caution. The following sub-sections assess the current
state of the right to water in Tripoli based on water availability, accessibility, affordability,
and quality; infrastructure conditions; and the degree of access provided to
impoverished populations and those without a legal status.
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3.1 Water Availability and Accessibility
The MoEW estimated the available renewable water resources per capita as 1,100
m3/year (MOE et al., 2011). The North Lebanon Water Establishment (WE) serves
Tripoli along with 7 other districts, each having its own water sources (D.S., personal
communication, 2016). Two major springs supply water to Tripoli: Hab and Abou Halqa,
both of which provide around 70,000 m3 of water per day to 100,000 registered users;
the deficit is compensated with groundwater coming from wells (J. Halawani, personal
communication, 2016). In total, the WE has the capacity to supply 90,000 m3 on a daily
basis, a quantity believed to exceed demand (D.S., personal communication, 2016),
although a report by the World Bank suggests that the RWEs fall short in meeting the
basic needs of households (World Bank, 2010). Accurate statistics on the total
population in Tripoli is unavailable, but estimates range from 450,000 to 600,000
including Syrian refugees (J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016); the World Bank
estimates Tripoli’s inhabitants at 500,000 (World Bank, 2010). The increased demand
on water as a result of the influx of refugees has been estimated at 7% (Republic of
Lebanon & UNDP, 2013).
The fact that only 100,000 of the residents are official subscribers to the network
raises questions about water accessibility for the rest of the population. Some obtain
water through alternative means, which may include illegal connections to the public
network, private wells, water facilities installed by internationally-funded NGOs, or
reliance on public fountains, social networks, or private sources such as bottled water.
For instance, the majority of residents in the Dam & Farz affluent neighbourhood are not
connected to the public network and rely instead on groundwater, despite the fact that
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the area is relatively newly developed (D.S.; J. Halawani, personal communication,
2016). Due to the proximity of the neighbourhood to the coast, the overuse of
groundwater and the consequent sea intrusion has affected the quality of groundwater,
thus compelling the residents to eventually subscribe to the public network anyway
(D.S., personal communication, 2016).
While water shortage and frequent rationing stretches all over Lebanon,
accessibility is especially an issue in marginalized areas as the allocation of resources,
including water, happens on the basis of class and regional privileges (Makdisi, 2007).
Ultimately, the uneven patterns of accessibility pertain to sectarian and political divisions
of power and resources, because “while all regions are confessionally mixed, each one
– with the exception of Beirut – has one pronounced sectarian majority” (Eid-Sabbagh,
2014, p. 75).
On a national level, the proportion of the population that uses the public network
for drinking purposes varies between 35% (Republic of Lebanon & UNDP, 2013), and
56% as reported by the CDR (Makdisi, 2007). Table 2 below summarizes the
proportions of households that relied on different sources of water in some of Tripoli’s
neighbourhoods in 2006 (see Figure 3 for a map of Tripoli’s layout). Despite the
agreement on the superiority of the supply service in Tripoli in comparison to most other
areas in the country, close investigation reveals invisible problems with access to water
within some of the impoverished suburbs in the city (as discussed in section 3.7).
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Mina

New City

Tabbaneh

Old City
Qobbeh

Dam & Farz
Abou Samra

Figure 3: Layout of Tripoli (Source: Basemap obtained from Google Maps)
Table 2: Household water supply in Tripoli 2006 (%). Adapted from (Kayal, 2006, cited in Allès, 2012)

Sources of water by
household
Public network

Qobbeh

Abou Samra

Old City

New City

69

58

67

3

Artesian well

13

4

-

9

Public fountain

-

5

-

-

Public network + artesian well

1

2

22

2

Public network + artesian well 1

2

2

24

+bottled water
Public network + bottled water

11

15

7

48

Artesian well + bottled water

5

12

1

14

53

Illegal connection

-

-

1

-

3.2 Water Demand and Consumption Patterns
Lebanon has been long believed to possess ample amounts of freshwater in
comparison to neighbouring countries. Yet its water resources fail to satisfy the needs of
the growing population and current consumption patterns. Water shortage and poor
quality is a nation-wide issue, especially during the dry season. Some believe, however,
that Lebanon’s precipitation levels should be sufficient to satisfy demand if water
resources were properly managed (Darwish, 2004; Republic of Lebanon & UNDP,
2013).
Due to the lack of water metering in Lebanon, available data on consumption
patterns is meagre. Nationally, across both rural and urban settings, domestic water
demand represented 25% of the total demand in 2003, expected to reach 45% by 2030
(World Bank, 2010). Estimates of domestic water consumption range from 100 L/day,
the national average (J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016), to 140 L/day, 180
L/day, and 200 L/day depending on the report (MOE et al., 2011). Within urban
dwellings, the average daily consumption is estimated at 200 to 250 L/person (Makdisi,
2007). Water consumption can reach as high as 265 L/day in affluent neighbourhoods,
as is the case in the Dam & Farz neighbourhood in Tripoli (J. Halawani, personal
communication, 2016). This amount is projected to reach 300 L/person/day by 2030
(Makdisi, 2007). The World Bank (2010) further breaks down domestic water
consumption of the households connected to the public network into categories
depending on the source of water supply: public water, delivery truck, water gallons,
bottled water (see Table 3).
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Table 3: Estimated expenditure and consumption by water source for connected households (adapted from
World Bank, 2010, p. 33)

Price range
(USD/m3)
Public water supply

0.3 – 0.8

Annual household
expenditure
(USD/HH/year)
112

Estimated
consumption
(L/capita/day)
187

Delivery trucks

3–6

72

10

Gallons

100 – 220

143

0.5

Water bottles

440 – 500

72

0.1

3.3 Condition of the Water Infrastructure
The literature reports a poor condition of the water infrastructure, devastated during the
civil war and never fully rehabilitated afterwards (Darwish, 2004; Eid-Sabbagh, 2014).
According to experts, 100% of the primary network has been rehabilitated within the
past 20 years in comparison to 80% of the secondary network and 50% of the tertiary
network (J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016).
In terms of maintenance, the RWE assumes responsibility for the maintenance of
the primary and secondary networks, while ensuring a clean and functional water supply
network from the entrance of a building to the individual apartments is the responsibility
of the house owner or tenant (J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016). Estimated
network losses range from 35% to 50% (El-Jisr & Chabarekh, 2012; MOE et al., 2011;
World Bank, 2010). Despite the reported significant decrease in network losses in
Tripoli as a result of the 2004 – 2007 PPP project (World Bank, 2010), assessment
reports indicate that the contracting company, Ondeo, fell short in meeting its objective
of loss reduction (Allès, 2012). The network performance, thus, remains inadequate.
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3.4 Water Quality
Data on the quality of drinking water in Lebanon is scarce. Yet several reports admit the
widespread issue of water contamination all over Lebanon due to the lack of wastewater
treatment, inefficiency of the sewer system, and seawater intrusion (El-Jisr &
Chabarekh, 2012). Nationally, contamination levels were found to be as high as 70% in
tested water, both piped and at the source, while 24% of the sampled privately-supplied
water was found microbiologically contaminated (Makdisi, 2007). Additionally, coastal
aquifers, which represent a major source of drinking water for many households in
Tripoli, are characterized by high levels of salinity due to the overuse of groundwater
and the consequent seawater intrusion, as has been the case in the Dam & Farz
neighbourhood; many of the wells are no longer operational (MOE et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, and although data is lacking, water professionals across a number of
organizations believe in the superiority of the quality of municipal water delivered by the
North Lebanon WE (D.S.; J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016). According to
Halawani, 50 water samples are tested at the source, storage tanks, and pipes on a
daily basis.
This view is not shared by citizens, many of whom distrust the quality of tap
water. This is evident in the fact that a low percentage, 35% or 56% depending on the
report, of connected households use the public network for drinking purposes. Mistrust
seems to be an issue even among authorities at the North Lebanon WE as apparent
from the incident one participant recounted in one of the interviews. During a meeting
between the members of the Friends of Water Association and authorities from the WE,
a particular governmental official used bottled water and refused to drink tap water in
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fear of waterborne disease. Upon the participant’s insistence, the official reluctantly
conceded to drink a cup of tap water, but jokingly promised to sue her were he to come
to any harm. Also, previous reports of pollution during the olive-harvesting season have
aggravated the public’s mistrust in the quality of public water (B. Jaber; H. Khalaf,
personal communication, 2016). Olive processing factories are known to have dumped
untreated waste into open water bodies, with residue making its way into the drinking
water system, altering the quality of tap water and generating an unpleasant taste.
Despite efforts to crack down on this practice (D.S.; H. Khalaf; J. Halawani; S. Saliba,
personal communication, 2016), people’s trust has not been restored. Even in cases
where affluent citizens receive a continuous supply of municipal water, they continue to
rely on other sources to secure drinking water.

3.5 Water Affordability
The current tariff structure is a flat rate based on a fixed annual subscription, regardless
of consumption patterns or socio-economic conditions. Fees are based on the spatial
area of residential units as shown in the table below. The minimum subscription fee is
based on a maximum consumption rate of 1 m3/day. An ascending consumption-based
fee

applies

when

consumption

volumes

exceed

3

m3/day

(D.S.,

personal

communication, 2016). While the minimum subscription fee, equivalent to USD 145, is
not considered extravagant, it does not take the user’s income into account (World Bank,
2010). Users unable to pay the full amount have only the option to pay the fees in
smaller instalments over the year (North Lebanon Water Establishment, 2012).
Table 4: Water tariff in Tripoli as of 2012 (North Lebanon Water Establishment, 2012)

Area (m2)

Minimum quantity Fees (L.L.)
(m3/day)

Fees (USD)

57

<200

1

220,000

145

200 to 300

2

420,000

280

>300

3

618,000

410

Nationally, households connected to the public network nevertheless spend
around 65% of their total water expenditure on private vendors whereas un-connected
households spend up to 75%. Of that expenditure, 35% is spent on water gallons,11
21% on water supplied through delivery trucks, and 16% on small water bottles (World
Bank, 2010).12 The expenditure on gallon and bottled water is high despite their low
quantity consumption in comparison to that of water supplied through the public network
or delivery trucks (World Bank, 2010).

Water prices according to the source of supply are as follows: 0.3 to 0.8 USD/m3
for public water, 3 to 6 USD/m3 for delivery truck, 100 to 220 USD/m3 for water gallons,
and 440-500 USD/m3 for bottled water (See Table 3). The total amount a single
household spends to purchase privately-supplied water (gallons, bottled, and truckdelivered) becomes close to USD 300. One of the interviewees, however, reported
higher numbers:
According to the World Bank, people spend from $250 to $300 a year to buy
bottled water because of the lack of trust in the public service. Also, during
periods of intermittent supply of water people resort to water tankers. So if you

11

The report does not define water gallons. It is assumed, based on conventional terms, that a
gallon here indicates a water container with a 5-gallon capacity.
12
The mismatch between the reported numbers and the total comes from the original source.
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account for these, one pays $800 to a $1000 a year to get water on top of that
supplied through the public network (S. Saliba, personal communication, 2016).

In any case, as the majority of households, connected or unconnected to the
public network, rely on private sources to obtain drinking water, users end up paying
twice or triple the water tariff (El-Jisr & Chabarekh, 2012). The resultant financial burden
proves especially taxing for economically deprived households.

3.6 Injustice for Low-income Populations
The injustice inflicted upon the socio-economically disadvantaged segments of society
is manifold, pertaining to both the water tariff and intermittent water supply. Although the
flat water tariff fee is considered affordable (World Bank, 2010), the minimum quantity is
fixed and may still prove taxing for some. A fixed tariff means that low-income users will
have to spend a larger portion of their income on securing water in comparison to more
affluent users. Subsidies for deprived households do not exist, and the official policy
states that users who fail to pay the annual fee are disconnected from the public
network. With over half the population in Tripoli identified as deprived (Nehmeh, 2010),
water affordability becomes jeopardized.
Low-income households are also more vulnerable than their affluent counterparts
to the intermittence of water supply, which involves multiple layers of injustices. As
mentioned earlier, the World Bank considers the expenditure on water for connected
households to be considered affordable, such that it is within the water expenditure
affordability threshold identified as 5% of the total household budget (World Bank, 2010).
The intermittent public water supply, however, which tends to be least reliable in
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deprived communities, compromises the ability of socio-economically disadvantaged
individuals to access water. This means that they have to either purchase expensive
private water they cannot afford, or go through other forms of hardship in pursuit of
securing water. The overdependence of low-income households on unregulated private
sources or the unsafe storage of water further increases their vulnerability to consuming
contaminated water. Moreover, in cases of being affected by waterborne diseases,
poorer individuals lack the socio-economic means to seek appropriate healthcare.
Water shortage is also partly associated with the ongoing rationing of electricity.
Since electric pumps are used to fill roof tanks with water, the daily electricity rationing
that lasts for several hours at a time temporarily disables the pumps and so the tanks
are not refilled once emptied. Households without subscriptions to private electric
generators may run out of water during the periods of no electricity if the tanks are
emptied too soon, and thus need to be more careful about their water consumption.
Since low-income households are unable to afford the expensive subscription to private
electric generators to compensate for the chronic electricity rationing, their ability to
access water is further undermined. Other forms of hardship come from having to
negotiate with neighbours or carry water from public fountains. As Makdisi (2007)
indicates, deprived urban suburbs suffer “severe deprivation” of access to water (p. 378).

3.7 Neighbourhoods Suffering from Water shortage – Coping Strategies
Despite the illegality of discrimination in the Lebanese constitution, inequitable access
to water is evident, and is part of a larger-scale discriminatory system characterized by
uneven regional development (Makdisi, 2007). Within Tripoli, discrimination in water
access largely affects poorer populations and those without a legal status. Areas that
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suffer from water shortage in Tripoli include the suburbs of Abou Samra and Qobbeh,
both considered impoverished (Nehmeh, 2010). The elevated geographical location of
both suburbs, and the fact that they are located in the extremities of the system,
introduces technical difficulties that compromise the quality of service delivery, such as
low pressure of delivered water (J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016).
Additionally, Palestinian refugees in the Baddawi camp in Tripoli, like all
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, are denied civil and social rights as they continue to
live in apartheid after six decades of their forced displacement from Palestine.
Established in 1955, the Baddawi camp lies five Km North of Tripoli’s centre, and today
hosts around 30,000 individuals who lack access to all kinds of public services including
water (UNRWA, n.d.). Instead, the residents of this camp rely on the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to obtain
basic services.

NGO representatives who are directly involved in water service provision report
that some of the ways in which residents in marginalized areas cope with the chronic
water shortage include storing water in containers or roof tanks (usually installed by
NGOs under the umbrella of WASH), carrying water from Hawuz (public fountains), or
by negotiating with neighbours who may have access to private wells (C. Nachabe, S.
AbdulRahman, and O. Assad, personal communication, 2016). In Qobbeh, for example,
many households use municipal water points to obtain their drinking water (ACTED,
2012). In some instances, residents obtain water through the illegal tapping into
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groundwater or the public network (Darwish, 2004). In the case of Palestinian refugee
camps, the UNRWA takes care of water provision and infrastructure (Makdisi, 2007).

4 The Right to Water: Findings and Analysis
The following subsections capture the perspectives of my research participants, and
other sources of data, on what the right to water means and their opinions on the
engagement of citizens in policymaking. The discussions should give the reader an idea
of the kinds of discourse specific to this case study, and reflect the general
understandings that shape widespread beliefs. Where applicable, I categorize the
discussions according to the occupation of participants (i.e. government officials, water
professionals, and NGO representatives). No discussion of citizens’ perspective on the
right to water exists in the upcoming analysis, since the interviews I conducted with this
particular category were too few to yield sound conclusions. I conclude with a brief note
on a previous initiative for public engagement in Tripoli: the Friends of Water
Association.

4.1 Perspectives on the ‘Right to Water’
Although the right to water is theoretically well accepted by governmental officials,
experts, and authority figures, it is mainly understood in the neoliberal sense. The ‘right
to water’ has been used to promote an agenda of neoliberalizing the water sector by
involving the private sector. Evidence of this is found in governmental documents,
internationally-prepared reports, and privatization promotion material (CIH, 2013; MoEW,
2012; North Lebanon Water Establishment, 2012). For instance, the National Water
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Sector Strategy (NWSS) proposed by the MoEW portrays water in its slogan as “a right
for every citizen, a resource for the whole country” (MoEW, 2012).
Among research participants, the belief in water as a human right seems to be
unquestionable and taken for granted. In fact, the majority of research participants
pondered over the intent of the question about what the right to water means. The
majority gave similar answers: that water is vital to life, the source of all living beings,
and thus is fundamentally a basic right that long predates its recognition by the UN.
Chadi Nachabe, president of Utopia, described the right to water as “very basic, and as
important as the right to live in dignity, to eat, and to play” (personal communication,
2016)). Nasser Nasrallah, president of Ibrahim Abd Al-Al Foundation, further stated:
The right to water is sacred, and this is true for all religions. Water should not be
available and accessible only to those who could afford it. You can't let people
die of thirst just because they are not able to pay. The UN acknowledged this
right in terms of the right to a fixed quantity, but this is an inevitable thing; the
right to water is as old as life itself (personal communication, 2016).

Despite the general acceptance of access to water as a fundamental right,
perceptions of what this right actually means and how it can be achieved varied among
participants. The dominant understanding of the right to water is one that entitles
citizens to a certain quantity of clean water to cover their basic needs. The participants’
initial response about what the right to water might entail revolved around access to
sufficient quantities of clean and safe water at an affordable cost. Hayek, for instance,
articulated his perception of the right to water as ensuring universal coverage, whether it
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be through governmental or private sector coverage (personal communication, 2016).
While mainstream perception of the right to water as the right to a fixed quantity is
clearly prevalent in the Lebanese context, specific numbers about how much this
minimum amount should be and affordability criteria seem to exist in expert documents
only.
Sometimes talking about the right to water was framed in relation to responsibility.
Discussions about the meaning of the right to water were accompanied by discussing
(a) the government’s responsibility to secure water, and (b) citizens’ responsibility to
conserve water. This discourse was especially noticeable among government officials,
water experts, previous members of the Friends of Water Association, and
representatives from the DAI NGO. One representative of the public sector
communicated her understanding of the right to water as the WE’s responsibility to
serve citizens: “Our job is to make this water available” (D.S., personal communication,
2016). Indeed, water on North Lebanon WE’s informational pamphlets is recognized as
a “right for every citizen” (North Lebanon Water Establishment, 2012). Furthermore,
“securing water is a shared responsibility” such that it is the WE’s responsibility to
secure and deliver water to subscribers, after which it becomes the responsibility of the
subscriber to ensure the conservation of this water and its protection from pollution
(North Lebanon Water Establishment, 2012). As a civil society member notes, “securing
water should be the responsibility of the government, but conserving water should be
observed by citizens” (K.S., personal communication, 2016).
On the same note, the justice in “water justice” elicited answers related to the
current structure of the tariff system, suggesting that the right to water, i.e. water justice,
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can be achieved through establishing a consumption-based tariff structure and the
installation of meters to monitor usage and induce conservation. Furthermore, As Saliba,
the Private Sector Engagement Team Leader of the LWP at DAI, put it, a small
proportion of people consume the majority of water. With the flat fee currently
implemented, everyone is treated equally (or unequally in this case) regardless of
consumption habits or socio-economic conditions. The current lump sum fee resembles
flat taxes on basic goods, which targets the poor rather than the rich; in effect, the poor
are subsidizing affluent consumers (S. Saliba, personal communication, 2016). One
way to address water inequities is through social tariff, that is, government subsidies
based on socio-economic needs (Z. Hayek, personal communication, 2016). Indeed,
many participants believe that applying a consumption-based tariff, complemented with
the installation of monitoring meters, while providing a minimum amount of water for
free would help to address the right to water (H. Khalaf; J. Halawani; M. Tahsaldar; S.
Saliba, personal communication, 2016). Roland Riachi, a political ecologist, believes
that water is a human right and the state should satisfy the need of every citizen for
water at little or no cost (Lebanese Economic Association & Friedrich Nauman Stiftung
Für Die Freiheit, 2016). Jalal Halawani, a water professional, identified the minimum
amount that should be supplied for free as equal to 50 L/person/day.
Overall, the majority of participants disagreed with the current tariff structure and
thought it unjust, with the exception of D.S, and employee at North Lebanon WE.
Although D.S. concurred that the current minimum amount of tariff is too large, she
believed it is reasonable and barely covers the WE’s expenses associated with water
treatment, maintenance, operation, and delivery. The financial deficit is also the result of
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illegal connections to the public network and the low rate of fee collection, reported as
10% across Lebanon in the early 2000s (Makdisi, 2007). The World Bank (2012)
reported a higher collection rate, estimated at 47% at the national level in 2010. In
Tripoli, the rate of fee collection improved with Ondeo’s PPP (World Bank, 2012),
reaching 55% after the contract had terminated (Allès, 2012). D.S. claimed that the
problem lies not in the tariff but in the lack of public trust in the WE services. A few
participants also complained about the prevalent misunderstanding among citizens in
regards to the tariff and the resulting uncooperative attitudes (D.S.; G. Akl; J. Halawani;
K.S., personal communication, 2016). The misconception has to do with people’s
expectations around the cost of water such that – in the opinion of governmental
officials and NGO representatives – people expect water to be completely free since it is
a basic human right. The participants emphasized the need to correct this view such
that water itself is indeed free but people need to pay for maintenance and operational
costs of water infrastructure (D.S.; G. Akl; J. Halawani; K.S., personal communication,
2016).

In sum, it would seem that interpretations of the right to water align with the
neoliberal view, where granting the right to water for every citizen is best achieved
through promoting conservation, reforming the current tariff structure, or involving the
private sector. In many cases, the right to water was seen as inseparable from users’
responsibility to conserve. In addition, terms such as “customers” or “consumers” were
repeatedly used to refer to the users of the public network (D.S.; H. Khalaf; J. Halawani;
K.S., personal communication, 2016). On more than one occasion, citizens informally
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referred to the WE as the Water Corporation, although the WE is a not-for-profit public
establishment.

4.2 Discourse of Water Scarcity, Technical Solutions and Privatization
In alignment with neoliberal perspectives, discussions of the right to water often take
place in relation to a discourse of scarcity and technical fixes. Notably, this is a
perspective that is amenable to the involvement of private capital in water supply
solutions.
Participants concurred that water supply in Tripoli is one of the best in the
country but they also shared concerns about a prospective water shortage. A discourse
of water scarcity due to climate change, population growth, increasing demand due to
the influx of Syrian refugees, aging infrastructure, and unsustainable consumption is
dominant among representatives of the public sector and NGOs. As one participant
mentioned: “We are completely to run out of water by 2070. If we don’t conserve water
now we won’t find any in the future” (H. Khalaf, personal communication, 2016). Another
water professional commented that Tripoli has no water scarcity problems at the
present time, but issues will arise 10 years from now when groundwater resources are
depleted (J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016). Participants see the solution to
water scarcity through the promotion of conservation, protection against pollution, water
harnessing through dams, a consumption-based tariff, effective management, and
rehabilitating the water infrastructure (D.S.; H. Khalaf; J. Halawani; K.S., personal
communication, 2016).
Echoes of the conservation discourse are also found in governmental leaflets.
For instance, the informational pamphlets distributed by the WE portray water
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conservation as the insurance against future shortage (North Lebanon Water
Establishment, 2014). Slogans such as “Conserve a little, so that enough water shall
remain for every neighbourhood” are used on pamphlets that promote water
conservation through encouraging the alteration of water use habits and the adoption of
water-conserving technologies (North Lebanon Water Establishment, 2014). It is worth
noting that these brochures have been produced in collaboration with international
agencies. While raising awareness about wise consumption is critical, it fails to address
the root causes underlying water shortage.
Finally, it is crucial to note the way these preceding framings of water challenges
leave an opening for the right to water to be taken up as part of pressures for water
privatization. For instance, Ziad Hayek believes that the involvement of the private
sector through PPPs is one way for achieving universal coverage of water needs and
thus addressing the right to water (personal communication, 2016). In one key example,
the compatibility of the ‘right to water’ with privatization is manifest in the Blue Gold
project. As part of Blue Gold’s promotional campaign, its proponents employ the ‘right to
water’ to attract supporters (CIH, 2013). In this case, the ‘right to water’ is used to
reinforce the neoliberal agenda. Rania Masri, an academic researcher, believes that the
initiative advances a hidden agenda of privatizing the water sector (R. Masri, personal
communication, 2016). So do the journalists Firas Abou-Mosleh (2014) and Ward
Abdallah (2015). The former describes the Blue Gold as a “deceitful plan to commodify
water in Lebanon”, and the latter accuses it of planning to transform water from being a
natural right for citizens to a commodity subjected to the risk of monopoly. It is
interesting to note that Abdalla (2015) supports water harvesting through dam
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construction as one possible solution to the manifold water problems. By denouncing
Blue Gold yet approving of dam construction, Abdalla demonstrates some of the further
ambiguities in the way the right to water can enter political discourse.
What all of the preceding discursive uses of the right to water close off is a
discussion of what Lebanese political ecologists have emphasized: the economic and
political power structures that are the root cause of water injustices (Eid-Sabbagh, 2014;
Masri, 2015). While some attribute the water crisis to both climatic factors and failed
management, they, unlike mainstream experts, refute the appropriateness of dams in
the case of Lebanon for several reasons.13 Such perspectives are uncommon in public
discourse, with technocratic fixes clearly dominating mainstream perception of water
supply solutions in the Lebanese context. In raising this distinction, my aim is by no
means to underestimate the challenges posed by climate change or to dismiss the
importance of water conservation. Rather, I aim to emphasize the need to move beyond
the simplistic interpretation of water shortage as “natural” towards addressing – and
challenging – the power relations underlying physical scarcity.

4.3 Public Engagement and the Right to Participate in Policymaking
The process of policymaking in Lebanon is enveloped with a lack of transparency, a
politics of secrecy, and the absence of information dissemination to the public—in short,
a reluctance to engage citizens. Policies are not posted online and obtaining access to

13

Roland Riachi attributed the infeasibility of dam construction in Lebanon to the karstic
limestone nature of Lebanon’s geology, which results in high volumes of infiltration, the nature
of Lebanon’s deep valleys such that higher walls are needed to retain small amounts of water,
high costs, uncertain feasibility, and the seismic faults underlying Lebanon’s topography makes
dam building a risky undertaking (Lebanese Economic Association & Friedrich Nauman Stiftung
Für Die Freiheit, 2016).
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government documents is extremely difficult. The case of water is no exception to this
tendency, and Makdisi’s (2007) comment on the lack of available data on water usage
and the status of water resources remains true today. This is partly a problem of
transparency, and partly a result of the fact that much important water data is never
collected in the first place (Darwish, 2004; Makdisi, 2007). The result of this lack of
information is a public lack of trust in government, and by extension in the water supply
system. Unfortunately, this lack of trust is reciprocal, where public discussions of water
issues are perceived as a threat to the reputation of the government and thus
discouraged (Darwish, 2004). Overall, access to information remains difficult as secrecy
surrounds the making of policy (Darwish, 2004). Even in cases where initiatives aim to
encourage citizen participation, the latter has been reduced to mere feedback on
completed plans, as was the case in the Ondeo PPP (Eid-Sabbagh, 2014). One of the
objectives of the project was the promotion of the participation of “customers”, facilitated
through establishing a customer desk to directly receive people’s complaints without
resorting to local leaders who act as intermediaries (Allès, 2012). The same is true for
the 2000 reform, which limited “the consultation of the national water strategy to a select
group of public officials, international donors and hand-picked civil society members
involved with technical expertise rather than social concerns” (Makdisi, 2007, p. 377).
When prompted as to whether the right to water should also entail the right to
participate in policymaking, participants in the research had conflicting opinions. Some
strongly endorsed the involvement of civil society in the decision-making process, while
others opposed. The opinions of the rest of the interviewees were somewhere in
between, with the majority approving of the cautious and strategic involvement of the
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public. Overall, I found that the opinions of participants with respect to the engagement
of the public and civil society did not depend on their occupations. The following
subsections breakdown the opinions of participants according to occupation.
4.3.1 Perspective of Government Officials and Water Professionals
Ziad Hayek, Secretary General of the Higher Council of Privatization, supported citizen
involvement only insofar as to correct misconceptions about tariff payment (i.e. that it
covers the cost of extraction, treatment, maintenance, and distribution rather than the
cost of the water itself), and to raise awareness about the need for conservation (Z.
Hayek, personal communication, 2016). On the other hand, he deemed the process of
policymaking too complicated to involve citizens, particularly where PPP is the subject
of interest. PPP, Hayek believes, is a complex and controversial concept that people
generally misunderstand as absolute privatization, which is generally perceived as
incompatible with the notion that water is a right and should, therefore, be free. Since
the general public lacks the necessary information needed to make informed decisions
about PPPs, for instance, what is needed instead is “policymakers making responsible
decisions” (Z. Hayek, personal communication, 2016). Maher Tahsaldar, head of the
accounting department at the North Lebanon WE and faculty at the Lebanese University,
supported the participation of citizens in policymaking, but indicated the need to first
clarify important concepts pertaining to the nature of water—whether it is a public,
private, or community good. For instance, a community governance scheme that follows
Ostrom’s model cannot take place in cases where water is considered a public or a
private good (M. Tahsaldar, personal communication, 2016). In Tahsaldar’s words: “If
we were to use Ostrom’s model for example, where water is governed by the
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community, it is not possible for a community to govern a public or a private good. This
is the problem”. Another employee at the North Lebanon WE showed cautious
openness to the opinions of citizens, but thought it infeasible to involve citizens in every
decisions because there are certain institutional procedures that need to be respected
(D.S., personal communication, 2016).
When asked about the willingness of the government to consider the opinions of
citizens or civil society members in the decision-making process, Tahsaldar responded
that the government is not receptive at all as individuals in power do not believe in
sharing with the people; he attributed this to the failure in management and
administration. J. Halawani shared the same opinion about the unwillingness of
policymakers to acknowledge the rights of citizens or civil society actors to participate in
decisions around water governance. Saliba indicated that the process is “at an
embryonic stage” as “engaging the public is a risk the government is unwilling to take”
(S. Saliba, personal communication, 2016).
Nevertheless, D.S., the employee at North Lebanon WE, reported the recent
launch of an initiative undertaken by the North Lebanon WE in the district of Bcharri.
The project aims to consult with citizens in regards to a directive blueprint for
wastewater by bringing together local farmers, citizens, municipal members, and
entrepreneurs (D.S., personal communication, 2016). Assessments of the project are
unavailable yet as it is still in its early stages.
4.3.2 Perspective of NGOs and Activists
Perhaps surprisingly, opinions among NGOs and activists were quite divergent, with
only a few speaking strongly in favour of robust citizen engagement in water policy
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making. Some representatives of NGOs and community members showed scepticism
towards the involvement of citizens in decision-making. “Decisions”, as a previous
member of the Friends of Water group stated, “should be left to the experts”, while
citizens must be “educated” or “made aware” of the vices of wasteful consumption (K.S.,
personal communication, 2016). On the other end of the spectrum, the activists Hosn
Khalaf and A.A. strongly supported the engagement of citizens in policymaking. Khalaf
further saw the ideal situation as one where the public sector, private sector, and civil
society collaborated together. Also, representatives of Utopia, an NGO that advocates
for social justice and undertakes small-scale water provision projects in Tripoli (see
section 4 in Appendix C), endorsed a democratic approach to water governance,
emphasizing that “the process of policy-making should be participatory” and confirming
the need for collaboration between the public sector, private sector, and communities (C.
Nachabe, personal communication, 2016).
Ali Darwish, President of Green Line, and Nasser Nasrallah, President of Ibrahim
Abd Al-Al Foundation, had a more cautious approach and suggested that engaging
citizens should happen through their elected representatives. Ali Darwish believes that it
is infeasible to consult with the public on every single decision since their rights are
already accounted for via elections (A. Darwish, personal communication, 2016).
However, there should be space in municipal meetings where public audiences can
participate (A. Darwish, personal communication, 2016). Salah Saliba and George Akl,
representatives of DAI, acknowledged the importance of involving civil society and
citizens in general, but also cautioned that the latter may be unprepared for this kind of
engagement as they lack the necessary knowledge of water issues (G. Akl and S.
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Saliba, personal communication, 2016). Nevertheless, DAI works on engaging civil
society along with the government and the private sector as part of the NGO’s work on
water problems that are caused by inefficient markets and incompetent governance
(DAI, n.d.).
Given these ambiguous views about citizen involvement from within civil society
organizations, it should perhaps come at no surprise that there is a general absence of
advocacy for improved water access, and a scarcity of NGOs that work on water issues
outside the framework of water provision. Even this latter kind of work fell out of favour
in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Darwish, 2004), but was taken up again after the
outbreak of the Syrian war due to the increasing demand (C. Nachabe, personal
communication, 2016). Several Western-based NGOs have acted as service providers
to compensate for the inadequacy of the state, by installing water facilities and
establishing connections in underserved areas (ACTED, 2012). Additionally, several
local NGOs, e.g. Utopia, have partnered with international agencies for the same
purpose, and continue to rely on international funding to support the development of
water projects in neighbourhoods undergoing armed conflict. From a human rights
perspective, though, the right to water is currently not on any organization’s agenda (C.
Nachabe; J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016).
4.3.3 Friends of Water Association
To highlight the difficulties surrounding the relationship between the government and
civil society, it is worth examining one particular failed strategy for greater public
engagement. In 2009, the Friends of Water Association (FWA) emerged out of the
collaboration between the North Lebanon WE and the French agency Rhône Alpes (H.
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Khalaf, personal communication, 2016). The aim of the top-down initiative was to bridge
the gap between the WE and citizens in hopes of repairing the WE’s tarnished
reputation by engaging members of the civil society. The main goal of the FWA, as
indicated by Hosn Khalaf and K.S., both previous members of the initiative, was to
educate citizens about the merits of water conservation (H. Khalaf and K.S., personal
communication, 2016). It is notable that being educated was the extent of citizen
involvement invisioned for the initiative. Moreover, the civil activists were selected by
the organization. After completing several training workshops about water facilities in
the north, treatment plants, effective communication, etc., the activists were unable to
undertake their assigned tasks of raising awareness among citizens due to tensions
between the WE and the FWA; the committee eventually split up, and the association
was discontinued (H. Khalaf, personal communication, 2016).
Hosn Khalaf, blamed the failure of the initiative on the uncooperative behavior of
the WE authorities, who strived to maintain control and protect their status by
disempowering the selected activists. In her opinion, governmental authorities felt
threatened by an empowered, well-educated civil society and thus were apprehensive
of potential conflicts over power (H. Khalaf, personal communication, 2016). On the
other hand, K.S. gave no particular reason for the termination of the initiative, but
indicated the lack of communication between the WE and the public as one possibility
(K.S., personal communication, 2016). Jalal Halawani, Head of the Department of
Public Health and Environment at the Lebanese University and training professional for
the FWA, questioned whether members in the initiative had sufficient access to
resources, and suggested this might be a reason for its failure. Finally, D.S., employee
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at the North Lebanon WE, attributed the failure of the initiative to the lack of capacity in
finance and human resources at the WE, such that no single employee could be
dedicated to oversee the project (personal communication, 2016).
Whether it be lack of political will or lack of logistics, a meaningful relationship
between the government and the public is clearly absent. Corruption, clientelism,
struggle for power, and the lack of trust between the government and citizens persist,
hindering the success of water reform initiatives and putting any hopes of democratic
water policy processes at a considerable distance.

5 Conclusion
Lebanon suffers from a complex series of water problems, manifest in the intermittent
supply and poor water quality. While Tripoli is doing better than most other regions,
water accessibility and affordability is still a widespread issue. Lack of access to water
reveals, and is connected to, various forms of hardship that most adversely affect the
vulnerable segments of society, who carry a heavier burden of water shortage. The
dissatisfaction of citizens with the performance of the public sector has opened the door
to the increased involvement of the private sector, as the majority of the population get
their drinking water via alternative means.
While there is political acknowledgement of water problems, they are mainly
articulated from the neoliberal perspective, often attributed to climate change,
unsustainable consumption, population growth, weak institutions, and ineffective
management. These are to be addressed through increased water harvesting,
infrastructure rehabilitation, conservation promotion and education, institutional reforms,
and the careful involvement of the private sector.
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The problems of the water sector, however, should be understood as sociospatial inequalities inherent to the complex political makeup of Lebanon that is mainly
characterized by clientelism, corruption, and sectarian territorialisation of power. "All
water problems are inherently political”, thus “requiring a political process for solution"
(Naff, 2009, p. 39). Given this and the several failed reformative initiatives, it can be
predicted that any superficial treatment of water issues in the existence of the current
political infrastructure is doomed to fail.
Faced with this context, the right to water plays an ambiguous role. Although the
right to water has existed since ancient times and is politically and socially well
accepted, it is mainly understood in the neoliberal sense: as access to a basic amount
of safe water. Yet even this humble goal remains unachieved. Inevitably, the
democratization of water policymaking is alien in this context. On a political level, the
right to water is rarely politicized, as there is a scarcity of NGOs and other forms of civil
society that work on water from a political standpoint. Even when the right to water is
employed, it is not incompatible with the mainstream neoliberal agenda such that both
proponents and opponents of privatization use the right to water ambiguously to
advance conflicting goals. Aside from the occasional sparse voices that advocate for
the right to water every now and then, mobilizations around water issues are almost
non-existent.
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Chapter IV: Agency and Social Mobilization
1 Introduction
The literature on environmental justice seeks to understand the origins and dynamics of
socio-environmental advocacy around the world. While this literature helps us
understand why mobilizations occur, it does not address as extensively the question of
why and how such mobilizations are sometimes absent even when environmental
injustice is clearly present. Given that water problems, specifically intermittent supply,
compel the majority of citizens to seek alternative sources in the case of Tripoli, and of
Lebanon in general, we might expect to see the right to water taken up by social
movements and civil society organizations (CSOs), as we do in other parts of the world.
Yet this study has found instead that the discourse around the right to water is only
weakly present and has a rather ambiguous political impact in the context of Tripoli.
How can this be explained? What are the limitations to political agency for marginalized
populations, and what kinds of considerations shape the approach of civil society
working on water issues in the country? And why has Tripoli not seen citizens take to
the streets as they have in other parts of the world?
The absence of water advocacy might suggest that water injustices do not exist.
Yet this is clearly not the case as demonstrated in Chapter III. In the present chapter I
explore various explanations for these findings. Developing these explanations requires
a better understanding of the dynamics of activism and the role of civil society14 in
enacting mass mobilizations to address social and environmental injustices. I argue that
14

For this research, I delimit civil society as “the place where a mélange of groups, associations,
clubs, guilds, and groups [sic] come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen”
(Augustus Richard Norton, cited in Yom, 2005, p. 18).
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even though social agency around water is largely absent within citizens’ interactions
with government, and does not take the form of mass mobilization in Tripoli, it does
exist through invisible coping strategies and alternate networks. To set the stage for
pursuing this argument, I first sketch out the regional historical processes of
modernization and colonialism that led to changes in the social order throughout the
19th and 20th centuries, shaping the context for contemporary social mobilization.
The chapter starts with an overview of social mobilization within the Arab World. I
then narrow my focus to study this phenomenon in Tripoli, Lebanon, focusing on the
role of select Lebanese CSOs15 that advocate for various issues of social justice. As I
pursue an answer to the question of why water justice advocacy seems relatively
absent from Tripoli, I discuss those CSOs with a few specific issues and questions in
mind. For a start, I am interested in the extent of their involvement with citizens, and
thus their potential in establishing a strong mobilizing foundation and advocacy network.
Second, given my focus on linked questions of social and environmental justice, I query
the role of CSOs in challenging systemic oppressions that are embedded in the sociopolitical structure in place. Finally, I turn my attention towards the broader landscape
within which CSOs operate to investigate the challenges we find there that impede
progress towards democratizing policymaking and increasing citizen participation in
political life.

15

CSOs are only one part of what can be considered mass mobilization, but they are key points
of articulation that can help us understand the broader landscape of civil society. Nevertheless,
some of my exploration of the case study will draw in other elements, such as activist networks.
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2 Historical Context: Overview of Arab Social Movements
To better understand the dynamics of contemporary social mobilization, it is worthwhile
to first sketch out the regional historical processes of modernization and colonialism that
led to changes in the social order throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.

2.1 Origins and Evolution of Civil Society in the Arab World
Up to the early 1900s, communities under the Ottoman reign were essentially selfgoverning for most matters. A study by Abraham Marcus (1992) describes the premodern Middle Eastern cities as consisting of active, localized, and organic
communities that provided the backbone of social welfare independently from a central
state. Only transboundary security affairs, the judicial system, and large-scale
infrastructure projects fell to higher authorities. The forms of civil society that existed at
the time included kin-based associations, professional and trade groups, charity
organizations, as well as self-regulated committees and institutions that managed
financial affairs. Charitable trusts, the waqf, covered the majority of expenses falling to
public government in the West.
This decentralized social governance meant that local leaders, tribal chiefs,
religious and ethnic figures, or familial notables (depending on the societal structure in
place) were the first point of contact with commoners, often endeavouring to provide
services, resolve local conflicts, and even challenge Ottoman decrees when they had
impacts on local well-being (Marcus, 1992). These influential figures essentially acted
as intermediaries between the community and authorities. The resulting multi-scale
interaction between the different networks that made up the societal fabric gave
communities pathways for mobilizing to express social discontent. While community ties
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have weakened over the time, they continue to represent an important avenue for social
support.
The pre-existing social order started to disintegrate with the era of modernity and
as a result of the wave of colonization that swept over the Middle East on the verge of
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In addition to the pre-existent guilds, charities, and
familial groups, new classes of society emerged such as trade unions and student
associations (Ibrahim, 1998). The social reformation based on the fusion of old localized
networks with emergent classes gave way to the birth of modern NGOs, first appearing
in Egypt and the Levant in the early 19th century, and often linked to anti-colonial
grassroots movements (Ibrahim, 1998). These movements, and the associated revolts
against imperial powers, were repressed during the consolidation of French and British
control in the region in the latter part of the 19th and first part of the 20th centuries.
Nevertheless, they subsequently grew in importance, and with the eventual end of
colonialism in the mid 20th century, many of those who were active in civil society
organizations and struggles for independence took up roles in government. Though this
originally made for a friendly political environment for NGOs, populist regimes that
emerged in parts of the Arab World in many cases led to authoritarian, reduced
freedoms and a diminished civil society (Ibrahim, 1998). The authoritarian state
replaced pre-existing forms of community associations, acting instead as the sole
provider of social benefits in return for citizens’ loyalty.
It should be noted that political process in Lebanon unfolded somewhat
differently, largely to the benefit of civil society. Post-colonial Lebanon enjoyed a relative
degree of political freedom in comparison to neighbouring states, especially prior to the
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direct involvement of the Syrian regime in Lebanese affairs. Thus, Lebanese civil
society did not undergo the same pressures as its counterparts elsewhere. Additionally,
the civil war and successive political unrest since 1975 rendered the state dysfunctional,
a condition that forced civil society to take the lead and resulted in the emergence of
other kinds of social support. In fact, many of the combatant militias themselves took on
the role of service provision within districts under their control (Aghina, 2015). The
resulting social and political order features various kinds of networks, including patronclient relations, which have in turn played a major role in shaping contemporary civil
society in Lebanon. These social and political networks were transformed again in the
late 20th century with the global advent of neoliberal ideology. The following section
treats this transformation in the broader context of a re-emergent civil society in the
Arab world.

2.2 Re-emergence of Arab Civil Society
Civil society in the Arab world regained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, given a
few transformational factors. The role of the state as the main provider of benefits such
as education, housing, health, food and fuel subsidies, and so on (Bayat, 2002),
retreated in favour of the private sector and free market, as most Arab states adopted
liberal economic policies during and after the 1980s (Yom, 2005). At the same time, the
region had been experiencing population growth, increase in income disparity and
poverty rates, and rapid urban expansion, hence necessitating alternative means of
meeting social needs (Asfari Institute, 2016). In tandem, international institutions and
NGOs began to promote the notion that civil society is a precondition for the transition
towards democracy in countries governed by the tight grip of authoritarian regimes
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(Yom, 2005). Voluntary associations that maintained independence from both the state
and familial affiliations were seen as the pathway to challenging oppressive structures
and gaining civil liberties (Yom, 2005). The transformations that resulted from the
globalization of neoliberalism and human rights ideals opened "new spaces for social
mobilization" (Bayat, 2002, p. 2).
Early responses to neoliberal shifts took the form of mass protests. One example
was the mass demonstration in Beirut in 1987 against the drop in value of the Lebanese
currency (Bayat, 2002). Bayat asserts that such mobilizations were merely a response
to major events of rare occurrence and scale, and hence inconsequential in terms of
generating lasting political change. Indeed, people resorted once again to social ties,
still relatively strong, to obtain services and supports not provided by the state in the
context of the economic crisis. Instead, Bayat (2002) emphasizes other kinds of
activism as more prominent: community activism, Islamic social movements, and what
he calls “quiet encroachment” (p. 19). The latter he defines as the form of support that
people obtain, often illegally, through social networks and alternate safety nets. As we
will see in section 3.2.3, it is this form of agency that predominates in Tripoli today.
Movements related to environmental justice are not widely documented as part of
this growth of modern Arab civil society. One example discussed by Bayat (2002) is that
of a grassroots movement in a small, socio-economically marginal Egyptian community
that protested the pollution caused by local smelters. Another similar environmental
movement, described by one environmentalist as the “first environmental intifada”
(uprising) in the Arab world, took place in Hay al-Sollum in Beirut in 1997 to denounce a
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polluting incinerator in the neighbourhood (Kingston, 2001, p. 60, emphasis in original).
No other cases of similar nature are reported in the scholarly literature.
2.2.1 Arab Civil Society and Democracy
Despite the widespread contributions of CSOs to democratization in different parts of
the world, CSOs in the Arab world have produced more mixed results. Yom (2005) goes
farther to argue that Arab CSOs have essentially failed to spark democratic change,
despite the enormous financial support that local organizations received from the
international community. Arab societies have been dominated by stubborn and
persistent autocratic regimes that Yom (2005) describes as “exceptional” in the world (p.
16). The capacity of CSOs to foster greater public participation in political decisions,
such as involvement in the making of water policies, depends on a number of factors,
including relationships with the state, the internal structure of the CSOs themselves,
public responses to civil society action, and patron-client networks.
The latter is especially central in the case of Lebanon where patron-client
relations work on multiple levels. First, they permeate people’s lives by compelling them
to seek services through local leaders. In turn, the latter’s status is reinforced. Second,
clientelism shapes the interaction of civil society with citizens and limits its potential
such that within a patron-client framework, the role of civil society is reduced to
“expand[ing] the scope of clientelist exchanges” (Kingston, 2001, p. 57). In some cases,
Kingston argues, civil society organizations themselves get absorbed into the patronclient framework.
The following case study of Tripoli explores these factors in more detail,
occasionally broadening the analysis to a national scale in order to round out the
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explanatory narrative. Bearing in mind the relative lack of mass mobilizations in general,
and ones related to the ‘right to water’ in particular, I also delve into the role of activist
networks. My intent is to illustrate the dynamics of social and political mobilizations in
order to explore the potential for grassroots endeavours to break through prevalent
patron-client relations and effect real change. Throughout this exploration, I chart where
the ‘right to water’ fits on the map of rising struggles, consider explanations for its
absence, and highlight other forms of agency.

3 Case Study: Tripoli, Lebanon
Tripoli is situated within a political landscape that is divided along sectarian lines, where
division of power and resources happens according to certain political arrangements
and sectarian quotas. For although the political structure in Lebanon is considered
constitutional democracy, actual power operates through "informal networks" that are
controlled by "sectarian elites" (Kingston, 2001, p. 57). Instead of the typical statecitizen model found elsewhere, the patron-client model dominates Lebanese sociopolitical structure and transcends people’s daily lives. This system of patronage exists
within a locally territorialized structure organized on a sectarian basis.
Accordingly, each leader provides for his clients, who most often belong to the
same sect as the leader (Makdisi, 2007; Lefevre, 2014; Eid-Sabbagh. 2014). Yet “the
issue with Tripoli”, in addition to its neglect by the state, “is that it has many leaders but
lacks leadership” as one political figure notes (cited in Lefévre, 2014, p. 8). In this
vacuum, Patron-client relations continue to dominate access to resources. Furthermore,
service provision has been transformed through the struggle over power into “a privately
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contested terrain” that has turned even “municipal authority into an extension of these
struggles” (Information International SAL, 2001, p. 86).

3.1 Overview of Advocacy Networks and Campaigns
Citizen mobilizations in the post-civil war era have rallied along the lines of political and
sectarian affiliations, where political leaders (zu’ama) usually recruit the masses to
advance political agendas. Recently, however, a few timid mobilizations with social or
environmental justice orientations have taken place. Extremely unusual in the context of
post-war Lebanon, these movements were not tainted by sectarianism, but started as
non-partisan (Kassir, 2015). Two major themes stand out: advocacy for public spaces
and the demand for a resolution to the waste crisis.
3.1.1 Advocacy for Public Spaces
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of new advocacy networks that have
adopted social justice issues. The networks vary in type: some are official NGOs, such
as Donia for Sustainable Development, and Nahnoo (in Beirut); some are coalitions,
such as the Committee for Monitoring Tripoli’s Projects; and others are unofficial
networks, such as the Civic Mobilization Network (see Appendix C for more information
about each group). These networks have launched several campaigns to advocate for a
variety of social issues, most prominently public spaces.
One such campaign is Our Sea, Our Land (see Appendix D, section 1 for more
details) that calls for the protection of public properties on the sea front in Tripoli against
the multiple illegal transgressions of public space. The campaign was launched by
Donia, headed by Nariman Shamaa, and supported by the Civic Mobilization Network,
led by Samer Annous. Other similar campaigns include the Underground Garage in
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Tripoli, which consisted of a coalition of activist networks to oppose the construction of
an underground garage that was to take place at the centre of Tripoli; and Horsh Beirut,
a campaign launched by Nahnoo to demand the reopening of the last green space in
Beirut (see Appendix D, sections 2 and 3 for details).
3.1.2 Response to the Waste Crisis
In late 2015, a movement emerged in the wake of a waste disposal crisis that affected
Beirut for eight months. Following the closure of a landfill site close to Beirut, garbage
accumulated in the streets. Consequently the You Stink movement, literally referring to
the garbage and metaphorically implying the corrupt government, picked up momentum
(BBC, 2015; Nader, 2015). The waste management crisis was but a reflection of the
political dysfunction that runs deep in the state. As one blogger commented: "[t]he trash
crisis in Lebanon is just a reminder of the system we live in. Stop being surprised. That's
what we built” (BBC, 2015). Recurring political deadlock, interlocked with increasing
economic hardships, seem to have exceeded citizens’ tolerance, leading to the
apparent breakage of the sectarianism and eventually the launch of the movement
(BBC, 2015). Far from being a mere reaction to the waste crisis, the series of protests
represented a response to the absurd living conditions, starting from the ongoing
electricity and water rationing to the sell-off of Beirut’s remaining public properties (The
Economist, 2011). As one citizen complained, "No electricity, no water, no security, no
president and on top of it all – rubbish" (BBC, 2015). The movement ultimately attacked
the overall corrupt political regime.
It should be noted that mobilization initiatives, specifically the You Stink
campaign, are controversial and their impacts questionable. On the one hand, activists
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are prone to being politicized by the zu’ama and it is difficult for mobilizations to survive
the pitfalls of sectarianism. Even if when they do, their potential for effecting real change
is highly doubtful, for the Lebanese political structure paralyzes any initiative that falls
outside the negotiated sectarian and territorialized division of power. For instance, when
the recent 2016 municipal elections in Tripoli went against the ruling elite, they
responded by utilizing their political influence to disable and impede the function of the
elected municipal council. The next section examines the neutralization of popular
mobilization in more detail.

3.2 Explanations for the lack of mobilizations around water justice
If environmental campaigns are few, then campaigns that specifically target water
injustices are noticeably fewer, not only in Tripoli but also at the national level. The
finding of Ali Darwish remains true today:
There is still a gap in the approach to water access from a human right concept.
Very few national non-governmental or community-based organizations dealt
with the water issues from an integrated human-rights-based perspective (2004,
p. 22).

Where local NGOs are involved with water, it is often to assume a role in service
provision. Many work closely with international agencies such as Oxfam, CARE, and the
UNHCR to provide water services for Syrian refugee camps and deprived
neighbourhoods in Tripoli. For instance, the UNHCR has partnered with local NGOs to
implement the WASH program, providing water and sanitation services in impoverished
communities. One local NGO that works on the WASH project in Tripoli is Utopia.
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According to representatives of Utopia, the latter started as a grassroots movement with
advocacy orientations (C. Nachabe; personal communication, 2016). It eventually
evolved into an established NGO, but lost its advocacy dimensions along the way.
Utopia covers a range of activities that focus on capacity building and providing
humanitarian aid to deprived populations (see Appendix C, section 4 for more
information about Utopia).
In fact, water advocacy is not prominent on the agenda of any organization
nation-wide (C. Nachabe; J. Halawani, personal communication, 2016). Of all the
activists and NGO representatives interviewed during the research, the only
organization claiming to have plans to pursue water advocacy was Nahnoo, an NGO
based in Beirut. In the extensive 5-year study that Nahnoo is undertaking on all of the
public services in Lebanon (including water, electricity, waste, etc.), water will be the
last on the list (A.A., personal communication, 2016).
In what follows, I explore a few different and interrelated explanations for the
relative absence of activism on water issues.
3.2.1 Complexity of the Water Sector
The easiest place to start when attempting to explain the absence of activism around
water is its complexity. The first reason for this complexity is that water management
and policy making is scattered across several bodies, making it difficult for organizations
like Nahnoo to mount campaigns that would achieve concrete policy change (A.A.,
personal communication, 2016). Second, the topic of water is manifold; there is water
extraction, water monitoring and treatment, water delivery, water pricing and metering,
etc. Third, and despite law 221/2000 that centralized water governance into four
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regional establishments, many local committees that previously oversaw water
governance remain in operation, and the RWEs are unable to stop them (A.A.; B. Jaber,
personal communication, 2016). Fourth, the problem of illegal tapping into the public
network is an issue that has become exacerbated given the increased demand after the
influx of Syrian refugees, numbering 70,000 in Tripoli (CARE International, 2015).
Finally, corruption exists in the form of water theft, where some intercept the public
network at one point and sell it elsewhere, in which case municipal water becomes the
object of black market exchange.
3.2.2 Invisibility of Water Injustices
The complexity of water issues is not the only reason for its absence on the agendas of
CSOs. Despite its pervasive role in daily routines, paradoxically, the social life of water
seems easy for people to ignore. Water is invisible in many ways, such that the
hydrosocial cycle itself is hidden as water runs under the streets and is thus out of
sight.16 In some ways, inequitable access to water is invisible in the sense that “nobody
has died of thirst” as Ali Darwish mentioned (personal communication, 2016). Also,
other daily struggles seem to be more pressing than the lack of household water as
various activists have reported (S. Annous, C. Nachabe, and A. Darwish, personal
communication, 2016). Recognizing the limited data obtained through interviews with
citizens, it should nonetheless be noted that a citizen of Tabbaneh, identified as the
most impoverished neighbourhood in Tripoli, exclaimed that even when an aid agency
installed water filters and cisterns in the neighbourhood, some residents chose to sell

16

Based on discussion with Dr. Karim Eid-Sabbagh.
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them out of extreme poverty in order to buy bread (citizen #3, personal communication,
2016).
Unlike other problems that are experienced with greater severity (such as
electricity rationing, unemployment, extreme poverty, taxes, and lack of public spaces),
people seem to find ways around water shortages such as resorting to bottled water,
illegal wells, municipal public fountains, and water storage facilities. These strategies, in
addition to the existence of social networks and other sources of income, have
alleviated some of the burdens associated with water shortage (Darwish, 2004; EidSabbagh, 2014). While such practices do not address the fundamental problem, they do
act as “pacifiers” (A. Darwish, personal communication, 2016).
3.2.3 Clientelist networks
Given the nature of the Lebanese socio-political structure, political affiliations and
patron-client relationships have become more prominent than state-citizen relations.
People have learned to reach out to their patrons, who represent them politically and on
the basis of religious sects, to seek services unfulfilled by the state. Local elites
intervene in the water sector, i.e. maintaining patronage relationships, through charity
and service provision (Allès, 2012).
In terms of water services, local elites have used their political clout to secure
water sources for and bring development projects to Tripoli, sometimes funding
infrastructure projects themselves (Allès, 2012). Elites can also utilize their political
networks to obtain permits that legitimize the existence of illegal wells, regardless of the
capacity of groundwater. As Kingston states: “In a political system where political
influence, rather than legal claims, have a dominant bearing on service provision and
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law enforcement” (cited in Makdisi, 2007, p. 381), patrons have the power to cover their
clients’ “fraudulent practices” (Allès, 2012, p. 399). Finally, local elites “act as
indispensable intermediaries between the water users and the public utility" (Allès, 2012,
p. 399). Similar practices can be found across Lebanon, where the elite are actively
involved in distributing power and resources to secure self-interest and maintain control
(Eid-Sabbagh, 2014).
3.2.4 Weak Civil Society – Weak Mobilization Base
The case of water gives us a window onto the weakness of civil society in Tripoli. Civil
society in Lebanon, as Kingston (2001) describes it, is “weak and divided” (p. 56). It
further lacks a large mobilization base as the impacts of local activism fail to transcend
to the national-level (Kingston, 2001). NGOs, in particular, have limited freedom since
they operate in areas that fall under the control of local leaders (Kingston, 2001).
When CSOs do undertake mobilization efforts, public response tends toward
apprehension or outright rejection. Several activists indicated that citizens tend to be
slow in trusting and supporting civil society (A.A.; H. Khalaf; N. Shamaa; S. Annous,
personal communication, 2016). The lack of public involvement is possibly related to
several factors: lack of trust in NGOs and their transparency in general, lost faith in the
responsiveness of the government, preoccupation with trying to make a living, and
absorption in sectarian and political conflicts (A. Darwish; S. Annous, personal
communication, 2016). As per Shamaa’s observation:
The majority of participants in protests are the same; the same people keep on
showing up again and again because it is difficult to mobilize citizens. This is
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because the majority of people are politicized17 while the rest have no interest in
participating (N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016).
Samer Annous, the leader of the Civic Mobilization Network in Tripoli, made a similar
comment, indicating that not many people were responsive to the network’s recent
mobilizations around the protection of public spaces and historical monuments. In fact,
many opposed. “The elite could easily recruit opponents [to our campaigns]”, he said,
“including even academics and students” (personal communication, 2016).
Even without the direct interference of sectarian elites in response to popular
mobilizations, an absence of trust in CSOs could also be tied to the continuous
disappointments and unmet expectations on the end of citizens. There is a lack of trust
in the government’s responsiveness on one hand, and suspicions around the real
motivations of the civil society groups themselves, on the other. Moreover, the presence
of several negative experiences have led people to constantly question the hidden
agendas of NGOs, especially given the fact that the elites have started to crowd the
landscape with their own CSOs.
Underlying these responses to the work of CSOs and activist networks is the
chronic sectarianism of Lebanese politics, which has played a major role in redirecting
ordinary people’s focus from social welfare issues towards divisive contentions. People
have been pulled into sectarian conflicts, which are drawn out by political leaders over
the course of decades. The public is involved (consciously or unconsciously) in
advancing the agendas of the elite like pawns on a chessboard. According to Shamaa,
“Sectarianism is causing colour-blindness” as it further distracts people away from the
17

Politicization here means affiliation with a particular sectarian group. As a result, individuals
refrain from engaging in mobilizations that originate outside that group or misalign with its
agenda.
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root causes to their problems and conceals entrenched injustices (personal
communication, 2016). As a result, the space for public dialogue—and the formation of
public opinion—is almost non-existent. Indeed, George Akl and Salah Saliba, both
representatives of the DAI development company, claim there is no genuine public
opinion. Rather, there is a mosaic of conflicting public opinions, the majority of which
are the result of sectarian propaganda and political recruitment.
Considering the You Stink campaign as an example, since it has been the largest
of its kind in recent years, internal and external problems manifest. The mobilization
failed in sustaining long-term momentum. Furthermore, the attempts of authority figures
to hijack the movement succeeded in swaying some participants (G. Akl; A. Darwish,
personal communication, 2016), a process aided by the internal confusion within the
movement itself. According to Ali Darwish, who also participated in the mobilization:
“There were 60 groups, the majority of whom got off track by their little
disagreements…They were then penetrated by politicians here and politicians there”.
Equally problematic was its representativeness of the larger population (G. Akl,
personal communication, 2016); at best, the protesters reached 30,000 (A. Darwish,
personal communication, 2016). Some even believe that the You Stink campaign was a
political fabrication (G. Akl, personal communication, 2016).
It should further be noted that the work of NGOs and activist networks is more
reactive than proactive. For the most part, activists are engrossed in dealing with urgent
issues related to the immediate impacts of development projects, which dictates the
nature of issues that make it to the groups’ agenda. Often, activists have to act on short
notice to mobilize against unexpected actions by the government (A.A.; S. Annous; A.
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Darwish; N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). In the case of the Civic
Mobilization Network, the activists are volunteers who have other full time commitments.
This responsive mode helps to explain the lack of mobilization around water injustice,
an issue that is chronic rather than acute, and does not seem to make headlines in the
news.
3.2.5 Passivity and Forced Adaptation
More subtly, the “resigned” attitude towards water displayed by many citizens can be
explained by Mehta’s (2016) analysis, which suggests that underserved, semi-legal
populations tend to accept their situations as inevitable. Instead of seeking social
welfare and other services from the government, they tend to “opt out of the formal
system, devise their own strategies and do not hope for any benefits from the state”
(Mehta, 2016, p. 38). I noticed a similar condition in Tripoli through non-participant
observation and interviews with citizens; while the majority of people constantly express
their discontent with the government’s performance, they seem to have no expectation
of any improvements. Ali Darwish described this pattern as “forced adaptation”, stating
that: “They've tamed people over the past 25 years after the war to accept the situation”
(A. Darwish, personal communication, 2016). Concerning Tripoli in particular, this
passivity comes at no surprise given the systematic marginalization of the city (see
Chapter II). The Minister of Social Affairs, also a native of Tripoli, expresses his
discontent with the “striking passivity of the city’s vital forces, leaders and figures, and
even its citizens in confronting this abnormal state of affairs”, further arguing that “Tripoli
appears to have lost its internal vitality and its ability to advocate vocally for its rights”
(Derbas, 2015, p. 20).
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4 Conclusion
From what has preceded, it is clear that mass mobilizations around the right to water
are non-existent, neither in Tripoli nor on a national scale. Recently, timid local
movements have emerged in response to certain issues – not including water – in
Tripoli and in other areas in Lebanon. Some of the recent mobilizations have managed
to halt top-down projects, others have failed, and all of them have encountered internal
and external crippling impediments, including internal dissent, external pressures,
sectarianism, and difficulty mobilizing the masses. One point to bear in mind is that the
majority of activists and participants in those mobilizations belong to the middle class.
This is important for two reasons. First it is crucial to note that middle class citizens can
afford to buy more expensive privately-supplied water, and as a result are not likely to
take up advocacy for water justice. Second, and more importantly, civil society activism
is carried out by those who are politically enabled. If civil society had more room to
operate in Lebanon, and could become an enabling space for a broader cross-section
of Lebanese society, then perhaps water would find its way onto the political agenda.
More prominent than mass mobilization are other forms of agency. Some of the
ways in which residents in marginalized areas cope with the chronic water shortage
include storing water in containers or roof tanks (usually installed by NGOs under the
umbrella of WASH), carrying water from Hawuz (public fountains), or by negotiating with
neighbours who may have access to private wells (citizen #1, personal communication,
2016). It is common for many households to use municipal water points to obtain
drinking water (ACTED, 2012). In some instances, residents obtain water through illegal
tapping into groundwater or the public network (Darwish, 2004). While such acts may be
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criminalized or considered unlawful, they reveal an underlying discontent with the
performance of the state and perhaps even rejection of its authority. They represent a
silent form of protest against injustices, and should therefore be seen as an expression
of

social

agency

rather

than

mere

acts

of

disobedience.
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Chapter V: Concluding Remarks
The world is witnessing a water crisis, manifest in the scarcity suffered by a large
proportion of the global population. In mainstream discourse, water scarcity is
normalized as natural, and solutions are seen to rest with proper management and
technological fixes. In contrast, political ecology offers a different perspective based on
the inseparability of human-nature relations. Political ecologists argue that underneath
physical scarcity lie political, economic, social, and cultural power relations that
perpetuate injustices. Water inequities should be recognized as problems of sociospatial inequalities rather than of scarcity, and need to be explained in light of the
operating power structures.
My case study, located in Tripoli, Lebanon, fits this perspective, where a hobbled
political system embeds all kinds of social and environmental injustices. As shown in
this paper, Tripoli suffers from widespread water problems that most adversely affect
impoverished populations. With the majority of the population reliant on private sources
for water supply, we might expect to see some sort of social movement taking place to
assert citizens’ right to water. Nevertheless, I have argued throughout the thesis that
inequitable access to water, even when it is a large-scale issue, may or may not result
in its politicization in the form of mass mobilization. Although in some parts of the world
water injustice has been a lightening rod for initiating mass mobilization, this link is not
inevitable. Tripoli provides an excellent example where politicization of water injustices
has not occurred. In fact, even mobilization around other kinds of social justice issues
are of limited number, scale and consequence.
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The Lebanese experience shows that the possibility of mobilizing for water equity
does not solely depend on the prevalence of injustices, but is determined by other
factors. Historical and political processes have produced contemporary societal spaces
and structures, with the various kinds of opportunities and barriers they represent. In the
case of Tripoli we can describe that structure as somewhere in-between an older premodern model of self-regulating communities and the Western model of states and
individual citizens. The resulting social order neither succeeds in transitioning towards
democracy, nor manages to recover a robust renewal of pre-existing familial and social
ties. This is a social order that preserves the localized nature of communities through
territorial and sectarian divisions of power, where patron-client relationships prevail as
mediating factors in the distribution of social welfare and state services. Water injustices
can be understood as one outcome of this fragmented landscape, which irepresses,
restricts, or at best distorts any potential social dissent around water or other social and
environmental injustices.

4.1 Obstacles and Challenges to Social Mobilization
The kinds of barriers that social justice activists have faced and will continue to face in
Lebanon need to be approached strategically. Internal hurdles stem from the divided
nature of the Lebanese political scene, where neutrality is a rarity. Even in the case of
neutral CSOs that are not tainted by a certain political orientation, quite often the
members will have varying political backgrounds, which increase their susceptibility to
external pressure, potentially threatening the unity and solidity of the CSO. This is
especially an issue in the case of coalitions that bring together NGOs and activists
belonging to a wide range of political and sectarian alignments to work on a common
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goal, in which case conflict and dissent are more likely to occur. Indeed, the diverse
political inclinations of participants in some of the campaigns mentioned above,
specifically the You Stink and Underground Garage, suffered from schisms generated
by a few key participants (S. Annous; A. Darwish; N. Shamaa, personal communication,
2016).
At the same time that activists navigate internal divisions, they are also presented
with external challenges. One pertains to the general lack of a large mobilization base,
which undermines the ability of advocates to attract supporters and exert influence (A.
Dawish, personal communication, 2016). Second, the international push toward an
increased role for civil society since the 1990s, together with the availability of
international funds, has led to the proliferation of NGOs. This has resulted in an
overwhelming number of organizations in competition for scarce resources (volunteers
and funds), limiting each group’s presence and influence (A. Darwish, personal
communication, 2016). Moreover, local NGOs compete with those manufactured by the
elite, who have more power and clout to influence the direction of funds and decisionmaking about projects. Finally, the reliance of local NGOs on international funds has
created relationships of dependence that could limit their agency.
The third factor relates to the role of the media, which, although has been positive
in some cases, proved restricting in others. Not only do activists lack access to and a
strong presence in official media channels, but they also have to deal with distorted
depictions of their mobilizations that are propagated by elite-controlled news sources
aiming to diminish their significance or discredit their voices. In some cases,
mobilizations are even subjected to a coordinated response, amounting to a “forced-
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media blackout” (Kassir, 2015). Activists often resort to social media as an alternative
mode of communication, with varying degrees of success in combating the dominant
media’s messaging.
Fourth, activists who work to expose prevailing corruption face various kinds of
risks. Many have been accused of being “anti-development” or “pro-poverty” as part of a
counter-discourse propaganda employed by the elite (S. Annous; N. Shamaa, personal
communication, 2016). This kind of discourse can be problematic because the majority
of civil activists belong to the middle class and, by implication, are not perceived as
representative of the poor (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). Therefore, they
are vulnerable to such critiques, and potential delegitimization in the eyes of
marginalized populations—even when activist efforts are directed at defending the
rights of those populations. Furthermore, by using anti-development discourse against
activist organizations, elites subtly advance neoliberal ideologies (S. Annous, personal
communication, 2016). Even more concerning, some activists have received lifethreatening warnings, and protestors have been subjected to violence at the hands of
security forces (Kassir, 2015).
A final obstacle faced by organizations advocating for substantive policy change
lies in what some activists call the “invisible system”. This term refers to the ambiguity
surrounding the decision-making process, which is related to the inter-sectoral elite
bargaining that occurs out of reach of democratic process. In other words, policy
decisions are often made behind the scenes and it is difficult to identify the points of
influence that have determined the outcome.
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4.2 Future Opportunities and Strategies for CSOs
The challenges discussed thus far provide lessons for future advocacy and other kinds
of civil society work. Perhaps foremost among these lessons is that earning the public’s
trust is key for the successful work of CSOs and for determining their degree of political
influence. Attaining credibility and building a popular basis for CSOs among the public
could help break the cycle of sectarianism as supporters unite around common social
issues rather than around divisive religious and other loyalties. It is therefore important
for CSOs to maintain a clear vision, transparency and overall political neutrality.
Ali Darwish suggests that more broadly speaking, one potentially effective starting
point for shifting systemic patterns of political influence is advocating for a change in
electoral laws (personal communication, 2016). Since voting happens based on the
place of origin rather than of residence, a large population in Tripoli and other cities
remain unrepresented. This further undermines feelings of belonging, and forgoes an
opportunity to hold authorities accountable. A change in the voting system could also
help empower municipalities, which in the experience of activists are easier to influence
than remote national authorities. Also, municipalities hold significant powers that remain
under-tapped.
In terms of a target population, there is consensus among research participants
that youth are the most receptive to and believers in the work of civil society. They
become especially enthusiastic once they realize the powers and privileges the
municipalities hold and how effective they can be in causing change. For instance,
Utopia strategically involves youth from marginalized communities in projects that foster
place attachment, a sense of belonging, and social empowerment. Similarly, Nahnoo
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has benefited from the involvement of youth in the project of Horsh Beirut, especially
during the initial phase of conducting participant research to identify social needs and
preferences (A.A., personal communication, 2016). The youth involved in that project
continue to have a significant presence as volunteers to help with ongoing maintenance
of the park and running events.
Finally, given the struggle of many CSOs with official media channels, social
media represents a powerful alternative, one that may even be more effective in
influencing public opinion. Several activists indicated the significant role the social
media had played in raising awareness and rallying for causes, and as a platform to
counter mainstream discourse. One issue lies in the need for human resources in order
to maximize the utility of social media, a capacity that many local NGOs and CSOs lack
(S. Annous; A. Darwish, personal communication, 2016). Engaging the youth in social
media affairs might help to address the lack in human resources while at the same time
fostering a strong sense of community and activism.

4.3 From Water Justice to Hydrosocial Agency
I started out this research with specific questions: to look for water justice movements
that identify themselves as such. This approach proved to be limiting, for hydrosocial
agency isn’t just manifested through political claims for water justice such as mass
mobilizations. Whether or not water issues gets mobilized is shaped by the interaction
of intertwining factors related to priorities, capacities, power structures, and political
opportunities within the particular socio-political context in which a case is situated.
Instead of mass movements, nuanced coping strategies were more relevant in the case
study I undertook. Agency of this kind takes a silent form, manifesting through
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navigating patron-client relations or more subtly through what would be considered
unlawful acts of disobedience. If not directly political, such agency is certainly social and
ecological, and forms part of the fabric of power relations. It embodies people’s
endeavour to reclaim access to their habitats and ultimately sustain their existence.
While I had not explored those coping strategies in depth, I should underscore them as
crucial and emphasize the importance of further research in this direction.
Navigating water inequities are in many ways unseen, related to the very nature of
the water landscape. The invisibility of daily water struggles should come at no surprise
given that water itself – its sources, allocation, and distribution – flows through channels
that fall outside the immediate consciousness of most people. Both literally and
metaphorically, water is hidden; it runs deep under the streets and so do the daily
struggles in its pursuit. While political ecology scholarship points us to the importance of
paying attention to the political claims for water justice, other invisible struggles must not
be forgotten when water inequities are the object of interest. Keeping in mind that the
politicization of the ‘right to water’ relates to the ways in which water injustices unfold in
the public sphere, political ecologists need to pay closer attention to how other forms of
agency operate in the absence of social mobilization. Zwarteveen and Boelens (2014)
argue that "some injustices never produce open disputes or struggles but instead
consist of the silent sufferings” (p. 15). It is my assertion that not only suffering is silent;
a range of other “quiet” practices by which people lay claim to water resources should
attract our attention as researchers. If this thesis only scratched the surface of such
practices, I would put them foremost on the future research agenda for understanding
hydrosocial relations in Lebanon.
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Appendices
Appendix A – Water Sector Actors
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Figure 4: First category (reproduced from Eid-Sabbagh, 2014)
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Figure 5: Second category (reproduced from Eid-Sabbagh, 2014)

116

Counil for
Development and
Reconstruction
(CDR)
Reconstruction
government agencies

Council of the South
(COS)

Central Fund for the
Dislaced (CFD)

Figure 6: Third category (reproduced from Eid-Sabbagh, 2014)
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Figure 7: Fourth category (reproduced from Eid-Sabbagh, 2014)
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Appendix B – Water Laws and Regulations
Table 5: Select Lebanese water laws and regulations (reproduced from Farajalla et al., 2015, pp. 30-32)

Law

Purpose

Law 1913

Irrigation Law of the Ottomans

Order No. 144, 1925

Protection of surface water and groundwater resources

Order No. 320/26, 1926

Protection of catchment areas

Decree No. 10231, 1955

Tripoli Water Investment System

Decree No. 10276, 1962

Protection zones for water sources and recharge areas

Law No. 66/20, 1966

Creation of the Ministry of Water and Electrical Resources

Decree No. 3275, 1972

Creation of independent establishments for drinking water

Decree No. 9627, 1996

Creation of a public institution called North Lebanon Water
Establishment and the merging of some water authorities
and committees within this authority

Law 221, 2000

The consolidation of local water offices and committees into
four regional water establishments, overseen by the MoEW

Law 228, 2000

National privatization law to encourage the participation of
the private sector in all sectors, including water and
electricity. Law 228 establishes a framework where future
public-private initiatives will be able to:
Regulate the economic sector in question; Identify
regulatory bodies to oversee public-private transfers and
monitor privatized projects; Specify the duration of
transactions pursuant to Article 89 of Lebanon’s Constitution

Law 337

To separate between macro and micro management of
water, and strengthen the policy of decentralization by
granting more autonomy to regional WAs

Law No. 401, 2003

Public participation in the management of the Tripoli Water
Authority was approved

Order of the Council of

10-year water plan for dams and mountain lakes

Minister No. 3, 2003
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Appendix C – NGOs and Advocacy Networks
1. Donia for sustainable development
A not-for-profit NGO based in Tripoli, Donia was established in 2013 and is headed by
the activist and freelance journalist Nariman Shamaa. It is part of a larger intergovernmental network of NGOs that come together under the umbrella of Anna Lindh
Foundation, which aims to empower civil society across the Mediterranean to achieve
cultural understanding (Anna Lindh Foundation, n.d.-a). Similar to its sister crossnational NGOs, Donia aims to achieve holistic sustainable development that takes into
consideration the social, economic, political, cultural, and environmental aspects in light
of international treaties and conventions (Anna Lindh Foundation, n.d.-b).
Areas of focus include social justice, democracy, human rights, gender equity,
economic and environmental sustainable development, and heritage preservation (Anna
Lindh Foundation, n.d.-b). From a social lens, the main objectives of Donia include
reducing poverty, empowering marginalized populations, fostering a culture of peace
and non-violence, and promoting gender equality (Anna Lindh Foundation, n.d.-b).
Economically, Donia works on fostering sustainable modes of consumption and
production in an environmentally-friendly fashion while also creating employment
opportunities for women, refugees, and immigrants (Anna Lindh Foundation, n.d.-b).
The cultural piece manifests in Donia’s campaigns for preserving historical heritage and
monuments of cultural value (Anna Lindh Foundation, n.d.-b). Politically, Donia
advocates for human and civil rights, promoting citizenship, and increasing political
participation (Anna Lindh Foundation, n.d.-b).
Donia played a crucial role in launching several campaigns, as Shamaa
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recounted. Shamaa and her group of activists first started with a campaign to save
Tripoli’s historical heritage. They signed petitions and rallied in front of the historical
buildings and monuments that were to be demolished based on governmental decrees.
Shamaa reported that this kind of mobilization had been absent before. Donia also gave
birth to Our Sea, Our Land campaign that advocates for the protection of public
properties on the sea front in Tripoli, and against the multiple illegal transgressions of
public spaces.

2. Committee for Monitoring Tripoli’s Projects
The committee was founded by Donia for Sustainable Development in 2014 and is also
headed by Nariman Shamaa. It comprises of a number of unions, community and
familial organizations, associations (most notably the Association of Academics),
experts (e.g. engineers and lawyers), former and current municipality members,
business owners, and civil society activists, all having diverse political backgrounds (N.
Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). The committee started with around 74
members, 40 of which were independent, but the number dropped as affiliated
members resigned under political pressure; currently the committee consists of 54
members (N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016).
The committee oversees development projects proposed for the city of Tripoli
and selects numerous social and environmental issues to focus on (N. Shamaa,
personal communication, 2016). Examples of these include the protection of Tripoli’s
historical heritage and public properties. They also focus on exposing the prevailing
corruption, especially at the level of municipalities, and raising awareness among
citizens (N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). The committee issued a

120

declaration in 2015, demanding (a) the democratization of the decision-making process,
particularly through involving civil society in regards to development projects concerning
Tripoli; (b) implementing projects based on a clear vision as part of a holistic
development plan that takes into consideration the historical significance of the city; (c)
accelerating the completion of the construction of the eastern and western belts of ElMina bridge, which has been ongoing for decades; and (d) addressing the traffic crisis in
the city centre (Alwifak, n.d.).
A pivotal focus for the committee is unveiling corruption in Tripoli’s municipalities
and empowering the latter to assume its powers. The current mechanism of decisionmaking within the municipality is not based on comprehensive studies that put the
interest of the citizens of Tripoli at the forefront (N. Shamaa, personal communication,
2016). Shamaa attributed the strengths of the committee to the thorough research it
undertakes to study proposed development projects. This approach, she continued,
enables expert members to point to legal loopholes in prospective enterprises
concerning the city. The members then coordinate with municipality members to discuss
future steps. Some of the committee members are concurrently municipal officials.
Shamaa believes that the committee’s work strengthened the status of civil society as a
whole: “It has gained us, and thus civil society, credibility” (personal communication,
2016).
The committee’s work is collaborative and the members utilize a variety of
mechanisms to pressure the government. By having expert members from various
disciplines on board, the committee is able to conduct comprehensive studies of
prospective development projects the government plans to undertake in Tripoli.
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Additionally, social media plays a major role in publicizing events, rallying the masses,
and exposing non-transparent deals that harm rather than benefit Tripoli and its citizens.
Members of the committee are well-connected such that they are able to stay informed
of new endeavours given their manifold networks in municipalities and other sources (S.
Annous; N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). In many cases, activists rely on
word of mouth to keep up-to-date with governmental undertakings in order to plan their
tactics/moves (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). This CSO collaborates with
and receives valuable support from the Civic Mobilization Network.

3. The Civic Mobilization Network
An unofficial network led by Samer Annous, an academic and activist, the Civic
Mobilization Network is both organized and unorganized in the sense that it does not
have an official designation as an established NGO. In fact, Annous prefers this form of
social order as he stated: “I don’t believe in NGOs”. The (un)organized social order
allows him and his fellow activists more freedom and flexibility, and keeps them immune
to the numerous pitfalls that come with being part of an official organization. In this way,
they are able to be effective without stumbling over the drawbacks that most NGOs are
susceptible to. Moreover, Annous expressed his suspicions surrounding several existing
nongovernmental organizations, especially given that many corrupt figures have
founded their own, adopting deluding banners. In his opinion, many environmental
organizations and experts are, indeed, “partners in crime” (personal communication,
2016). He used the example of the You Stink mobilization, discussed further below, to
illustrate how certain environmental NGOs were complicit. For instance, the Green
Party had indicated that incinerators were harmless as the party’s secretary declared
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her support of the minister (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). Overall,
Annous acknowledged the efficacy of some NGOs but questioned the capability of
existing traditional ones in Tripoli, in particular, to effectively lobby18 for change. Indeed,
he voiced his concerns with the lack of ability to lobby, as did Shamaa who indicated
that her group’s influence is not huge but partial and local.
In terms of how this group works, Annous indicated that he coordinates with
members in his social network to respond at a short notice to projects that are to take
place at any point in time (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). As soon as they
learn of new issues they react immediately by spreading the word through social media
and written articles. They also collaborate with activists affiliated with other groups such
as Tripoli’s Projects. The Civic Mobilization Network has been involved in several
campaigns, including Our Sea, Our Land, which opposed the trespassing of the sea
front of El-Mina and that of Tripoli. They had also taken part in the mobilization against
the underground garage project, and in smaller protests against the demolishment of
historical buildings in Tripoli (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016).
The network maintains working relationships with journalists, who offer valuable
support to the group’s endeavours. They also hold public meetings at the Association of
Academics given that the latter is considered a neutral space. Another opposing
mechanism is attending promotional events that the elite organize to market their
projects; the activists offer a counter-discourse to raise awareness among the audience
and expose the hidden agendas behind these projects (S. Annous, personal
communication, 2016). Of course, this has subjected the involved activists to various

18

This is the term the participant used.
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pressures as discussed further below. In terms of the activists’ backgrounds, Annous
indicated that the majority of mobilizations have been initiated by academics or students
since these tend to enjoy a relative degree of independence others may lack (personal
communication, 2016). That is, this category of activists is better able to withstand
various kinds of pressure than are conventional employees or shop owners, whose
livelihoods may be jeopardized in the process (S. Annous, personal communication,
2016).
The approach that the Civic Mobilization Network adopts is responsive, and more
reactive than proactive, a strategy that seems to be paying off. The network was able to
temporarily halt the Tripoli Sea Land project.

4. Utopia
According to representatives of Utopia, the latter started as a grassroots movement with
advocacy orientations. It first focused on launching campaigns and eventually evolved
into an established NGO (C. Nachabe, personal communication, 2016). In the past,
Utopia worked on establishing a few public water points (Sabeel), but these got
discontinued since the WE had a limited budget to spend on projects in Tripoli (C.
Nachabe, personal communication, 2016). The committee of Utopia then decided to opt
for more impactful projects such as solid waste management, drainage systems,
drinking water treatment, and the installation of water tanks to cope with water
shortages instead of smaller water supply facilities (C. Nachabe, personal
communication, 2016). More recently Utopia has been involved in installing water
pumps in some of the refugee camps in al-Koura. The other aspect of Utopia’s work
focuses on humanitarian aid and capacity building. Examples of such projects include
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fostering recreational activities, skill-training workshops, women empowerment
initiatives, and engaging youth in projects that aim to rehabilitate and enhance street
aesthetics in their own communities (C. Nachabe, personal communication, 2016). The
majority of its work is focused in Tabbaneh, Qobbeh, and Mallouleh, all of which are
considered deprived, conflict zones (C. Nachabe, personal communication, 2016).
The process of project selection passes through several stages. Utopia first
consults with members of the community to identify their needs. Based on the outcome
of the consultations and on expert assessments, Utopia proposes potential projects to
its partners, who then seek the approval of the MoEW (C. Nachabe, personal
communication, 2016). Utopia’s partners include all the NGOs that fall under the
umbrella of the UNHCR e.g. CARE, Solidarity, René Mouawwad, and Coopi (C.
Nachabe, personal communication, 2016).
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Appendix D – Advocacy Campaigns
1. Our Sea, Our Land
A few development projects started to take place on the sea front of Tripoli and the
coastal town of Mina, raising a great deal of attention and controversy. The unofficial
Civic Mobilization Network, led by Samer Annous, in collaboration with other activists
have advocated for the protection of public property on the sea front in Mina. Over the
past few decades, the shore had undergone several pavement projects issued by the
municipality to accommodate the city’s rapid urban expansion. On more than one
occasion, though, the implemented pavement projects served as a preparatory stage for
prospective investment enterprises of a private nature such as luxurious beach resorts.
Annous explained how Tripoli’s bourgeoisie used their political clout to obtain the
government’s approval of the proposed projects and to even alter the outcomes of
environmental impact assessments to their favour (personal communication, 2016).
For instance, a new fish market was established by a prominent local figure,
Safadi, using the money of the World Bank. This illustrates the corruption on the end of
international donors (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). The fish market was
doomed to fail, as it was unnecessary and could not compete with the well-established,
traditional fish market in the town: “That new fish market is not working anymore. It is
just sitting there and being ugly”, one participant noted. Other failed projects include a
life-saving boat, which cost around USD 100,000, donated by a European entity; the
boat was quickly abandoned partly due to the lack of maintenance (S. Annous, personal
communication, 2016).
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Even in cases where development projects were designated as public spaces,
the process of their implementation was full of ambiguities. For instance, the
implementation of a public park established on the small island adjacent to the shore
lacked transparency (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). The project was
made possible because of the influence of the minister of labour, who is also a native of
Tripoli; he relied on his network to get the project approved (S. Annous, personal
communication, 2016). A number of problems surrounded the project’s execution. First,
it was unclear how the project would be managed, who the beneficiaries were, or where
the funding came from (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). This illustrates the
double-sided role that NGOs can play, either positively or negatively. He further voiced
his concern about the high probability of the presence of clientalism and nepotism in the
undertaking of the project, and questioned its sustainability on the long term. Finally, the
small zoo that was incorporated into the island, in his opinion, reinforces the colonial
agenda that he and other activists are striving to combat. Below is an example of one
project the Our Sea, Our Land campaign has targeted.

2. Tripoli Sea Land Project
Most recently, expansive sea pavement and construction work have taken place on the
sea fronts of Tripoli and El-Mina in preparation for the establishment of a large-scale
project called ‘Tripoli Sea Land’ (Shamaa, 2016). The neoliberal enterprise is the
offspring of the collaboration of ten of the country’s bourgeoisie (S. Annous, personal
communication, 2016). According to preliminary blueprints, Sea Land will comprise of
housing units, touristic resorts, commercial facilities, and recreational amenities that will
occupy a million m2 of land, part of which is public property (Shamaa, 2016). The
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contractor company even proposed dedicating 300 m2 of land (currently occupied by
municipal roads, gas stations, small convenience stores, and public spaces such as
parks and mosques) towards the prospective project (Shamaa, 2016). If implemented,
the project would require a daily water supply of around 1200 m3, an amount the North
Lebanon WE is unable to provide (Shamaa, 2013). Additionally, a municipal report
identified a total of 40 legal, environmental, and technical loopholes in the project
(Shamaa, 2016). The contractor company had already proceeded with sea pavement
along the shore well before a permit was issued by the municipality (Shamaa, 2016).
The danger of such initiatives, in Annous’s opinion, is the associated
demographic change they bring upon. Local residents, most of who come from
disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, will be driven out of the area because
they cannot afford the expensive housing. Moreover, the privatization of the sea front
means that smaller kiosks and trades, and the day workers dependent on them, will no
longer be welcome were the new developments to take place (S. Annous, personal
communication, 2016). Street vendors would not be able to make a living if grand
projects replaced existing humble structures. Moreover, the sea front represents one of
the very few public spaces still accessible for people with modest means (S. Annous,
personal communication, 2016). Any grand enterprise that follows the suite of the highend Solidere or Zaytouna Bay in Beirut will be detrimental to existing populations (S.
Annous, personal communication, 2016).
To promote these projects, stakeholders employ a discourse of fighting poverty,
a propaganda Annous thinks is misleading as these projects are in fact fatal to the
poor’s livelihoods (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). In his opinion, the goal
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behind these profit-oriented projects is not to serve the poor as proclaimed by the
stakeholders, but rather to change the demography of the area. Given that the majority
of the sea front dwellers are considered poor, their existence negatively affects the
investment factor (S. Annous, personal communication, 2016). He contended that
promoting these development projects as potentially bringing prosperity to the region is
delusive, yet it often attracts the category of population that will be harmed the most (S.
Annous, personal communication, 2016). The latter don’t realize that had these projects
been implemented, they would no longer be able to enjoy a cup of coffee for a few cents,
or make a living by carrying on with street vending activities (S. Annous, personal
communication, 2016).
Stemming out of the belief that any development project needs to consider the
interests of the existing dwellers first and foremost, several civil societal groups
coalesced to oppose the project, launching Our Sea, Our Land campaign (Shamaa,
2016). The main groups involved were the Civic Mobilization Network and Tripoli’s
Projects. They fought back through several mechanisms: demonstrations, counterdiscourse, social media, and published articles (S. Annous, personal communication,
2016). When asking whether the struggle against the enterprise had been successful,
Annous replied that the project did not pass, which would be considered a success. The
movement’s exerted pressure managed to disable 16 voting trials in a single year
(Shamaa, 2016). Due to the increasing objections and the efforts of the involved
activists, the project was temporarily halted, awaiting the decision of the then to-beelected municipal council (Shamaa, 2016).
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3. Underground Garage
Activists from the Civic Mobilization Network were also part of a campaign launched
against a proposed underground garage that was to take place at the centre of Tripoli.
The project had been on file since 2002 but never executed. Most recently, the Centre
for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) pressured the municipality to accelerate the
project’s execution, but municipal members disapproved unanimously due to the
environmental risks the project posed and the absence of a holistic development plan
for the region (Al-Ankabout, 2016). Ten days later, the municipality revoked its refusal
under pressure from the Future Movement political party, and the underground garage
was soon underway (Al-Ankabout, 2016).
Yet the project elicited concerns and faced objections by Tripoli’s Projects civil
society group. In contrast to what was promoted, the underground garage would not
help in solving the traffic crisis. Tripoli’s Projects committee got sidetracked by the
venture, and had to put aside the 12 issues it had identified of interest to the citizens of
Tripoli in order to rally against the underground garage initiative (N. Shamaa, personal
communication, 2016).
According to Shamaa, the activists had a clear vision and specific demands.
They demanded that the municipality, which was unaware of the project, assume its
responsibilities rather than remain marginalized in the face of decisions made by the
CDR (N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). Shamaa reported how some
municipal members, who opposed the project initially, revised their positions under
political pressure (personal communication, 2016). This resulted in animosity between
the municipality and activists, who used a stern discourse against the government. The
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activists were not “acting aimlessly” and were not necessarily opposed to the garage
altogether, but rather to the mechanism through which it was being imposed (N.
Shamaa, personal communication, 2016). In other words, they requested an overview
of the development plan for the area and a thorough study of the traffic issue and
environmental risks, both of which were lacking, in order to make informed decisions (N.
Shamaa, personal communication, 2016).
The activists endured various kinds of threats and intimidation from authorities.
Shamaa reported that she and other participating activists received life-threats and were
subjected to emotional and psychological pressure; they also had to deal with yobs that
powerful figures had recruited to deter the activists. Besides, the activists lacked solid
support from citizens, whose initial response was discouraging and at-best cautious.
While several groups initially coalesced to oppose the initiative, some of the
participants eventually split up for various reasons. The intimidation techniques
succeeded in discouraging a few people, and others were dissuaded by their political
inclinations; the schism weakened the coalition (N. Shamaa, personal communication,
2016). To pacify the outraged activists, the government conducted a study on the
development of the city square, but Shamaa reported that the study was
incomprehensive and contained ambiguities. Thus the protest continued, as did the
implementation of the project. The breaking point was on a Sunday morning when
Shamaa and three other women took to the street to prevent the commencement of
construction work. They had to block the way with their bodies so as to stop the
construction trucks from advancing. Following this incident, and after utilizing social
media, the four activists finally managed to rally people around their cause. In the wake
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of this mobilization, Shamaa re-invited the parties they were not on good terms with but
found them responsive this time. So was Annous’s Civic Mobilization Network, and all
participants camped in the city square for days (personal communication, 2016).
The mobilization had a sounding effect, and managed to attract people from a
variety of political backgrounds, including even proponents of the Future Movement,
which was a major partisan of the project (N. Shamaa, personal communication, 2016).
Shamaa reported that authority figures tried to hijack the movement by politically
penetrating the participants, but their efforts were in vain since the activists succeeded
in maintaining a strong presence on the ground despite their diverse political
orientations (personal communication, 2016). Shamaa was pleased with the support the
movement received, including logistic and social media support. Eventually the project
did not pass. Moreover, active members of the mentioned association made it into the
municipality, which promises a better coordination between the municipality and Tripoli’s
Projects committee towards the benefit of the city and its residents.

4. Horsh Beirut
Nahnoo, a grassroots NGO based in Beirut, launched its first campaign in 2012 to
advocate for the reopening of Horsh Beirut, the capital’s largest green space that had
been closed since 1992 (NDI, 2015). A member of Nahnoo tells the story of the
reopening of Horsh Beirut; through conducting participatory research and surveys in
which the youth were engaged, Nahnoo found that the need for public spaces
represented a first priority for the residents of Beirut (personal communication, 2016).
Representatives from Nahnoo approached the municipality to raise the citizens’
concerns, but were faced with rejection on the premise that the municipality lacked the
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resources to maintain the park once reopened (A.A., personal communication, 2016;
NDI, 2015). Nahnoo then mobilized for the cause and managed to arrange for a public
meeting with municipal authorities to discuss the issue (A.A., personal communication,
2016; NDI, 2015). A.A. reported the official’s initial hesitation, but indicated that he later
subdued under the pressure from the audience. By lobbying the municipality and
engaging the public, Nahnoo succeeded in having Horsh Beirut reopened in 2015. It is
worth noting that the NGO has played and continues to play a key role in supporting the
municipality by preparing a plan for the proper management of the Horsh, overseeing its
maintenance, and providing volunteers (NDI, 2015). Although the park remains open to
date, Nahnoo’s struggle is ongoing against the government’s persistent, systematic
encroachment of the park.
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Appendix E – Reflexivity
Qualitative research encourages the practice of self-reflection in an attempt to invite the
researcher to examine any prejudices or pre-held assumptions that may interfere with
the credibility of research findings and analyses. Reflection is an opportunity for the
researcher to situate him/herself and acknowledge the perspectives he/she brings into
any particular research. Through recognizing personal biases, researchers become
better capable of mitigating their impact on the quality of the research outcomes.
Ultimately, those subjectivities shape not only the way a researcher sees and describes
events but also determines how participants interact with him/her, and how the findings
are later interpreted.
In this section, I share parts of my background to help the reader understand my
position as a researcher and how my location might have affected the conclusions I
arrived at. I also share my own reflections on the interactions I had and the fieldwork
experience as a whole.

Personal Background
I am a Muslim Sunni female of Middle Eastern ethnicity. At the time of fieldwork, I was in
my mid twenties. I was born in the town of Mina, Tripoli the same summer the civil war
ended, but my first-hand experience living in Lebanon was limited to the 24 months I
spent there as an adolescent, besides short annual visits. In this sense, I consider
myself both an insider and an outsider. I am an insider given my familiarity with the
culture, language, and Tripoli’s layout, and the fact that I could blend in as I am unlikely
to be spotted as an outsider roaming about the city. This acted as a catalyst such that I
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did not need extra time in the field to learn the language and find my way around.
Tapping into the connections I already had helped me to recruit participants faster than I
would have otherwise. My Middle Eastern identity and knowledge of Arabic also allowed
me to connect to locals spontaneously and enabled me to understand daily
conversations that took place in public spaces, thus enriching my data collection and
overall field experience.
At the same time, I could be considered an outsider because of my minimal
background living in the city; the sense of place I feel toward Tripoli differs from that of
full-time inhabitants as I had a different level of attachment to and a more complicated
relationship with the city. The latter is constantly shifting. Coming from a middle-class
family and having had very limited experience living in Tripoli, I hadn’t experienced
water stress the way inhabitants of the city might have. Part of my outsider identity
comes from my position as a novice researcher such that the knowledge I possessed of
the water sector dynamics, the actors involved, and the political-economic landscape in
my chosen case study was meagre prior to fieldwork. I believe this worked to my
advantage in the sense that it increased the credibility of my findings. A lowered level of
expectations helped me to keep an open mind to a variety of perspectives as I sought
answers to the questions I set out to investigate.
Having been exposed to some kind of gender discrimination in Tripoli in the past,
I expected to face a similar prejudice during my fieldwork. For the most part, this wasn’t
the case as I found most people I came in contact with extremely respectful. One
exception was during an interview with a male participant; I felt intimidated by his
interrogative behaviour. The gender factor also had some impact on my mobility,
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especially restricting the time frame within which I could wander alone and determining
the neighbourhoods I could visit unaccompanied. In some instances, I felt unsafe
walking into isolated areas on my own, especially ones where armed conflicts have
taken place more recently. However, I would say that my identity as an outsider to those
communities played a more prominent role in holding me back from pursuing further
interaction with residents than did my gender; I was self-conscious about my position as
a Canadian researcher and felt concerned about how citizens would perceive me, and
what power dynamics might be at play. In addition, the living conditions I witnessed
during my brief visits to those neighbourhoods were disturbing and magnified my
concern of the power distance. Both of these factors, in addition to the limited time I had
in the field, prevented me from doing more work with those communities than I had
hoped to. Other times, I felt that being a young female worked to my advantage,
possibly rendering me less threatening and thus facilitating my initial interaction with
others.

Assumptions
Prior to conducting interviews, I wasn’t sure what to expect but I had assumed to find it
difficult to recruit participants because of the laid-back nature of the country. To the
contrary, I found most people whom I had contacted responsive and timely. I was also
concerned about the responsiveness of government officials, but found the majority
willing to cooperate, except for one incident when a high-profile figure at a public facility
refused to meet with me. A few other researchers I had been in contact with reported a
similar response. Most of the other participants I had interviewed seemed cooperative
and sympathetic, supportive even.
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Given the existing sectarian divisions across Lebanon, I had concerns about how
my identity as a Muslim, visible through my name and head cover, affected the way
others perceived me. I wondered whether some would be apprehensive or feel
uncomfortable participating in the research, but I encountered no such behaviour at all.
To the contrary, most were friendly and open-minded. Being aware of the entrenched
sectarianism, I felt uncertain—sometimes sceptical—of movements that claimed
neutrality. After meeting several activists, however, I became convinced of their genuine
anti-sectarian position.
Since I had already prepared a set of questions for each category of the
participants, the questions I asked were fairly consistent across the interviews. The
questions were approved by my supervisor prior to the commencement of fieldwork,
which helped in eliminating personal biases I might have been oblivious to otherwise.
The semi-structured design ensured consistency while allowing me the flexibility to
pursue emergent themes I may not have accounted for. I had no emotional or other kind
of personal connection to any of the participants. Being a naturally good listener, I am
confident that I was equally attentive during all of the interviews regardless of the
participant’s position or status.
As a native of Tripoli, the major bias I brought to this project was the choice of
the case study itself. To mitigate prejudice, I adopted a systematic approach when
designing the study by adhering to the ethical standards of the academic institution, and
the research protocol established by the social science scholarship. I also extensively
discussed my research findings with my supervisor, and briefly with other researchers.
Therefore, I’m confident in the transparency of the collected data and the credibility of
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my analytical approach. Another bias I was aware of relates to the common belief in
Tripoli’s marginalized status, a discourse I had been repeatedly exposed to at different
stages of my life. I was concerned that my location as a citizen of Tripoli had nudged me
to unjustifiably believe in what could be identified as a conspiracy theory. I had initially
avoided raising the subject or incorporating it in my written material out of concern of
succumbing to an unverified bias. However, the marginality theme persistently
appeared in people’s daily conversations, newspaper articles, and social media. Taking
into consideration that people’s beliefs shape their realities and identities to a certain
extent, I felt obliged to explore the topic regardless of whether or not the claim was true.
Throughout fieldwork, I found that I had to continuously remind myself to refrain
from victimizing residents who struggle with water shortage, but to recognize their social
agency in overcoming hardship. I wouldn’t have arrived at such a mindset had I not
been exposed to political ecology literature.

Rethinking Fieldwork
If I were to do this fieldwork again, I would allow myself more time in the field in order to
gain a comprehensive picture of the civil society landscape. Due to the lack of presence
of many NGOs and activist network on the web (maybe more so the lack of a reliable
database that documents existing ones), I found that I needed extra time on the ground
to trace down existing organizations, and fully understand the extent of their
involvement with citizens and the kinds of issue they work on. More time would have
also allowed me to investigate in more depth the controversial issue of the Jannah dam,
which is the closest to what we would consider an environmental movement. I would
have also discussed my research findings with local researchers, whose expertise

138

would have provided different perspectives into my work and crystallized my
understanding of the regional dynamics. Finally, if I were to do this research again, I
would appreciate collaborating with a local NGO, which would have enabled me to do
more work with communities.
The biases I have shared in this section are the ones I am aware of, but there are
certainly other factors I may be oblivious to. I recognize that this work represents one
snapshot of a specific moment in time and space, a single perspective of a multi-faceted
reality. My research as I view it is but an attempt to engage in the ongoing academic
conversation that had started long before me and will continue long afterwards.
Realizing that no human work is perfect, I welcome opinions, feedback, and
contributions with an open mind.
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